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Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment:
Redrawing “High-Crime Areas”
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson*
Crime-mapping technology has the potential to reshape Fourth Amendment protections
in designated “high-crime areas.” In Illinois v. Wardlow the Supreme Court held that
presence in a high-crime area is one of only two factors necessary for creating
reasonable suspicion to stop an individual. Since Wardlow, thousands of federal and
state cases have used the term “high-crime area,” yet only a handful of courts have
considered how to define it. New crime-mapping technologies can now address that
definitional problem. Crime-mapping technologies can collect and analyze crime
statistics so that police districts can produce almost perfect information about the level,
rate, and geographic location of crimes in any given area. The result: police can define
official “high-crime areas” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Crime-mapping technology raises significant Fourth Amendment questions. Does
crime-mapping technology alter the existing Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion
analysis? Will this technology create an implicit high-crime area exception to the
Fourth Amendment? How will this technology effect police-citizen encounters and
liberty interests in officially designated high-crime areas? This Article addresses these
questions in an effort to reevaluate and rethink the concept of the high-crime area as
understood by the courts. Tracing the history and practice of crime-mapping
technology and its effect on Fourth Amendment doctrine, this Article proposes a new
framework and redefinition of the term that is both informed by existing crimemapping technologies and consistent with Fourth Amendment principles.

* Assistant Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law, University of the District of
Columbia; LL.M., Georgetown University Law School, 2004; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law
School, 2000. The Author would like to thank Alissa Starzak, Dean Shelley Broderick, and Professors
David Rudovsky, Abbe Smith, Louis Virelli, and Timothy Hart for their comments and assistance in
improving this Article.
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Introduction
Virtually everyone in one section of Brooklyn’s Brownsville
neighborhood has either been stopped, questioned and frisked by the
police, or they know someone who has . . . . [T]he overwhelming
majority of people stopped and frisked by the NYPD have committed
no crime. The statistics . . . . show that [an eight-block area] had 52,000
stops between January 2006 and March 2010. That averages nearly one
1
stop a year for every person who lives in the . . . area.

On a map of a city, an irregular rectangle is marked off in gray. It is
a “high-crime area,” a “hotspot” of crime. The chief of police has duly
designated the north, south, east, and west boundaries. It is official,
documented, and legal. The shaded area means there existed a
statistically disproportionate amount of crime during a given time period.
Depending on the jurisdiction, this map may result in an increased police
presence or targeted police activities in an area. As a strictly
2
administrative matter, a “high-crime area” designation may be a good
example of data-driven policing—responding to crime-ridden areas with
increased police presence. As a legal matter, however, this designation
3
may have Fourth Amendment implications. More fundamentally, for the
thousands of citizens living inside this shaded area, this official
designation has the potential to alter the liberty protections they enjoy:
because these people live in a high-crime area, they may receive less
protection under the Fourth Amendment and it may be more reasonable
4
for police to stop or search them on suspicion of criminal activity.
5
This Article focuses on crime-mapping technology, including
Geographic Information Systems (“GIS”) and how this developing
technology has the potential to reshape Fourth Amendment protections
in designated high-crime areas. In the past few years, the ability of police
administrators to identify and officially label high-crime areas has rapidly
6
expanded. GIS crime-mapping technology has simplified the collection

1. James Ford, Nearly Every Resident in Brooklyn Neighborhood Stopped, Frisked, WPIX
News 11, July 12, 2010, http://www.wpix.com/news/wpix-stop-and-frisk-brownsville,0,89085,print.story.
2. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). The term “high-crime area” will be defined and
discussed throughout this Article.
3. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that the people have a
right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
4. Adam Carlis, The Illegality of Vertical Patrols, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 2002, 2009 (2009)
(“[S]topping and frisking individuals in a poor community is significantly easier than stopping and
frisking individuals on the ‘right’ side of town. As a result, those living in ‘high crime areas’ receive less
robust protection from the Fourth Amendment than those in areas with lower crime rates.”).
5. The term “crime mapping” is used as shorthand for the entire GIS technology spectrum,
which includes data collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime data in all forms—maps and
otherwise. GIS technology involves computer based systems to record and analyze crime patterns. See
infra Part II.
6. See Derek J. Paulsen & Matthew B. Robinson, Crime Mapping and Spatial Aspects of
Crime 154 (2d ed. 2009).
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and analysis of crime statistics. Sophisticated computer programs,
databases, and algorithms have made it easier empirically to designate
7
certain areas as having a disproportionately higher level of crime.
Simply stated, these GIS crime-mapping technologies can produce
8
almost perfect information about the frequency and geographic location
9
of crimes in any given area. The crime data can be broken down and
analyzed by location, crime, and time period. Some jurisdictions have
almost real-time data collection and daily reports of problematic areas to
10
officers in the field. There is no longer a statistical question about which
11
areas, in fact, have higher levels of crime. Maps can be created detailing
the last twenty auto thefts in a given neighborhood, the last three months
of drug arrests within a city, or the locations of all of the homicides
committed in a given year. Typically, the data collection, storage, and
analysis are done by police administrators to determine staffing needs or
12
allocate resources. However, these technologies can now be used
13
officially to label areas as having an empirically higher level of crime.
While these technologies serve as effective policing tools, they also
present unexamined constitutional questions. Under existing Supreme
14
Court precedent, Illinois v. Wardlow, the fact that an area is designated
15
a high-crime area has Fourth Amendment implications. Such a finding
7. See generally Keith Harries, Mapping Crime: Principle and Practice 92 (1999); Paulsen &
Robinson, supra note 6, at 154; Luc Anselin et al., Spatial Analyses of Crime, in 4 Criminal Justice
2000 at 213, 215 (David Duffee ed., 2000); see also infra Part II.
8. It is important not to overstate the accuracy of existing data. While the technology exists to
have complete and thorough data of crime patterns, there also are limitations in the collection and
analysis of the data. Importantly, the positional accuracy of the crime location data available is limited
by the technology in use. Interview with Dr. Timothy Hart, Assistant Professor, Univ. of Nev., Las
Vegas (Jan. 2011).
9. See infra Part II.
10. James J. Willis et al., Making Sense of COMPSTAT: A Theory-Based Analysis of
Organizational Change in Three Police Departments, 41 Law & Soc’y Rev. 147, 172 (2007); John
Douglass, Tactical Deployment: The Next Great Shift in Law Enforcement?, Geography & Pub. Safety,
Jan. 2009, at 6, 7.
11. In large measure, crime-mapping technology focuses only on “street crime” as opposed to
corporate crime, cyber crime, identity theft, or fraud. This focus on street crime in combination with a
focus on crime mapping can distort the understanding of overall crime patterns in a jurisdiction. See
John Markovic & Christopher Stone, Crime Mapping and the Policing of Democratic Societies 2
(2002) (“The fact that unreported crimes cannot be mapped influences which types of crime police and
researchers try to map. Categories of crime that are reported to the police with some regularity, such
as homicide and auto theft, are more frequently mapped than categories that are rarely reported, such
as drug sales and simple assault.”).
12. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J.
Sci. & Tech. L. 1, 73 (2004) (“‘Crime’-location patterns are also used to allocate resources; they let law
enforcement agencies allocate officers to geographical areas where certain types of ‘crimes,’ at least,
are committed with the greatest frequency.”).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
15. See Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. 448, 448 (2008) (Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972).
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in a suppression hearing can affect a court’s determination about
whether police officers had “reasonable suspicion” to stop an individual
16
suspected of a crime. After Wardlow, the fact that the stop occurred in a
“‘high crime area’ [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a
17
Terry [v. Ohio] analysis.” The result in Wardlow was a finding of
reasonable suspicion based on the “totality of circumstances” of only two
18
factors—a high-crime area plus an unprovoked flight from police. In
19
thousands of post-Wardlow cases, the designation of an area as a highcrime area has had not only constitutional effects on the liberty interests
of individuals in those areas, but also practical effects on courts analyzing
20
the reasonableness of a Fourth Amendment stop.
What a “high-crime area” is, however, has not been defined by
21
courts, legislatures, or police administrators in any consistent fashion. In
contested Fourth Amendment hearings, determinations are made on a
case-by-case basis, with differing levels of proof, conflicting definitions,
22
and contradictory outcomes. Much of the reason for this divergence
results from the long-standing difficulty of collecting and analyzing crime
statistics to make them useful for court consideration. This reality has
been changed by the advent of new crime-mapping technologies.
Two questions frame this Article. First, how does GIS crimemapping technology alter Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion

16. See, e.g., Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a
Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9 Geo. J. on Poverty L. & Pol’y 135, 135 (2002); Brian D. Walsh, Illinois
v. Wardlow: High-Crime Areas, Flight, and the Fourth Amendment, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 879, 879–80
(2002); Debra Meek Nelson, Comment, Illinois v. Wardlow: A Single Factor Totality, 2001 Utah L.
Rev. 509, 511.
17. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams, 407 U.S. at 144, 147–48; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)).
18. Id. (“In this case, moreover, it was not merely respondent’s presence in an area of heavy
narcotics trafficking that aroused the officers’ suspicion, but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police. Our cases have also recognized that nervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in
determining reasonable suspicion.”).
19. In the years since Wardlow was decided, there have been over one thousand federal and state
cases citing the term “high-crime area” in reference to a finding of reasonable suspicion. This number
comes from the Author’s search of Westlaw and Lexis and includes unpublished but reported
opinions.
20. See infra Part III; see also Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street:
Considering the Character of the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 Ohio St. L.J.
99, 100 (1999).
21. Carlis, supra note 4, at 2010 (“Even though finding an area to be ‘high crime’ greatly reduces
Fourth Amendment protections, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate what constitutes such an area
and exactly how it affects the determination of whether a police stop comports with the Fourth
Amendment. This lack of guidance means that there is no agreement among either state or lower
federal courts as to either what constitutes a high crime area or what the effects of such a
determination should be.”).
22. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,
57 Am. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1588–89 (2008).
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analysis? Or more pointedly, will application of the technology within the
existing legal doctrine create an implicit “high-crime area exception” to
the Fourth Amendment? Second, how will this technology alter policecitizen encounters and liberty interests in officially designated high-crime
areas? These framing questions lead to a reevaluation of the “high-crime
area” terminology as understood by the courts. This Article proposes a
redefinition of the term that builds on and is informed by existing crimemapping technologies.
Part I of this Article details the history and development of GIS
23
crime-mapping analysis. Part II provides a brief overview of the
technical requirements of GIS and explains how the technology works in
practice, using three real-world examples. Part III examines how courts
have used existing crime-mapping technologies to address the Fourth
Amendment “high-crime area” question. Part IV examines the
intersection of crime-mapping technologies and the Fourth Amendment,
exploring how these technologies shape our understanding of reasonable
suspicion and restructure police-citizen encounters in official high-crime
areas. Part V proposes a new framework to address the high-crime area
question. In this Article, I argue for rejecting the existing overgeneralized
“high-crime area” terminology and replacing it with a more data-driven
and specific understanding of crime patterns in an area. The result will be
a particularized approach based on timely, accurate, and targeted crime
data about crime patterns in a defined location. Part VI addresses
concerns with this proposal, particularly regarding the transparency,
accuracy, fairness, equality, and legitimacy of GIS crime-mapping
techniques. The Article concludes with an acknowledgment of the
tensions raised by the development of these new technologies, but with a
proposed solution that replaces the “high-crime area” terminology with a
more particularized and targeted framework for Fourth Amendment
analysis.

I. The Rise of GIS Crime-Mapping Technologies
24
Crime maps have been around since the earliest days of policing.
Picture a push-pin map stuck on a police captain’s wall, with different
colored pins representing different crimes. Looking at the wall, a police
23. Nina Cope, Intelligence Led Policing or Policing Led Intelligence?: Integrating Volume Crime
Analysis into Policing, 44 Brit. J. Criminology 188, 191 (2004) (“Crime analysis incorporates the
collection and review of information into manageable summaries, for example crime maps or network
charts, to facilitate its interpretation.”).
24. As one police chief from Lincoln, Nebraska explained, “Back at police headquarters in
Lincoln, someone was sticking coloured pins in a map on the wall when Teddy Roosevelt was
President. In those days the pins represented saloons, or horse thefts, stick-ups or burglaries, maybe
accidents, houses of ill repute.” Spencer Chainey & Jerry Ratcliffe, GIS and Crime Mapping 8
(2005) (citing a case study by Tom Casady, Chief of Police, Lincoln, Nebraska); see also Harries,
supra note 7, at 1.
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administrator could develop a good understanding of the crime patterns
in his jurisdiction. Tracking crime along geographic lines makes sense
25
because most crimes involve a particular physical location. Most police
departments are localized and target the specific “places” where crime
26
occurs in their jurisdictions. Thus, crime-mapping technologies have
taken on the routine task of recording the place of a crime and have
adapted sophisticated analytical tools to better understand, organize, and
27
express the information. The fundamental reason for collecting crime
data—to understand past criminal activity in order to combat future
28
criminal activity—remains unchanged.
A. Early Crime Mapping
1. The Classical School
The first crime maps predate the rise of computers and even the
development of modern police administrations. Beginning in the mid1800s, French and Belgian social ecologists undertook the first formal
29
study of crime and place. The “classical” or “cartographic” school was
30
led by social ecologists Andre-Michel Guerry and Lambert-Adolphe
31
Quetelet. Specifically, they studied rates of “crime, suicide, alcoholism,
population age structure, family structure, educational levels, and
population diversity,” with the goal of understanding where crime was
occurring, what populations were living in those locations, and under
32
what social conditions. With their followers, these early pioneers were
25. Brenner, supra note 12, at 52 (“[R]eal-world crime . . . must be conducted in physical, actual
space.”). The vast majority of crimes require four component parts: (1) a law, (2) an offender,
(3) a target/victim, and (4) a place. See Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 2.
26. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts,
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 551, 656 (1997).
27. Ronald F. Wright, Fragmented Users of Crime Predictions, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 91, 92 (2010)
(“Police departments have produced crime reports since the nineteenth century, but only recently did
they begin to use database techniques to analyze geographic and other trends in crime.”).
28. Cope, supra note 23, at 188 (“Crime analysis is the process of identifying patterns and
relationships between crime data and other relevant data sources to prioritize and target police
activity.”).
29. See Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 216–17.
30. In 1833, Guerry published his findings in a book of maps that displayed a visual connection
between violent crime and property crime in areas of France. See Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6,
at 48; see also Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 81.
31. Gerben J.N. Bruinsma, Urbanization and Urban Crime: Dutch Geographical and
Environmental Research, 35 Crime & Just. 453, 454 (2007) (tracing the history of criminology).
Quetelet used statistics to map spatial variations of “undesirable” elements of society, including
concentrated pockets of beggars and smugglers. In attempting to explain the positive correlation of
crime rates and social conditions, Quetelet went beyond mere statistical calculations to develop the
first type of formal crime analysis. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 81; Paulsen & Robinson,
supra note 6, at 152.
32. See Harries, supra note 7, at 4 (“The social ecology school concentrated on geographic
variations in social conditions under the assumption that they were related to patterns of crime.”);
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among the first to document and map “the empirical regularity of
33
crime.”
2. The Chicago School
In the United States, the first sustained scholarly project of mapping
34
criminal activity occurred at the University of Chicago in the 1930s.
Urban sociologists Robert Park, Clifford Shaw, and Henry McKay
35
undertook an effort to identify the link between geography and crime.
Chicago provided a fertile ground for the study because its population
36
had doubled each decade from 1860 to 1910, creating an urban
environment with increasing levels of crime. The Chicago School
initiated a study of juvenile delinquency, mapping the addresses and
37
neighborhoods of the young men involved in the delinquency system.
The purpose was to analyze the “social disorganization” effects of the
areas where these young men lived and study the distribution of crime in
38
Chicago. The maps and studies developed by the Chicago School
demonstrated a stable delinquency pattern over time within certain areas
39
of Chicago. The Chicago School found that crime was positively
correlated with economically disadvantaged areas and demonstrated a
link between delinquency rates and “features of community structure
40
like economic status, stability, and racial composition.” These findings
inspired the field of criminology and incubated new theories of “crime
and place,” such as “social disorganization” theory, “routine activities”
theory, and “defensible space” theory—theories which, over time, led to
an interest in studying how newly developed GIS technologies could help
41
researchers understand patterns of criminal activity.

Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 217.
33. Bruinsma, supra note 31, at 457; see Harries, supra note 7, at 4 (“The cartographic or
geographic school dominated between 1830 and 1880, starting in France and spreading to England.
This work was based on social data, which governments were beginning to gather. Findings tended to
center on the influence of variables such as wealth and population density on levels of crime.”); see
also Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 216.
34. The Chicago School included scholars outside of the University of Chicago, but the name
derived from the School of Sociology at the University of Chicago. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note
24, at 82.
35. The Chicago School of Criminology was inspired by Park’s early studies of the parallels
between “the natural distribution of plant life and the societal organization of human life.” Paulsen &
Robinson, supra note 6, at 49; see also Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 1, 82.
36. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 49.
37. Bruinsma, supra note 31, at 454.
38. Id.
39. See Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 217–18.
40. Ralph B. Taylor, Crime and Small-Scale Places: What We Know, What We Can Prevent, and
What Else We Need to Know, in Crime and Place: Plenary Papers of the 1997 Conference on
Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation 1, 14 (1998); see also Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 217–
18.
41. “Social disorganization theory posits the idea that increased levels of delinquency, especially
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B. The Rise of GIS Crime Analysis
While the theories seeking to explain the link between criminal
activity and physical location have a long history, the technological tools
to conduct empirical studies and then translate those studies to police in
the field did not arrive until the mid-1980s and only became
42
commercially available beginning in the late 1990s. It was not until
improvements in computer software developed and technology costs
decreased that law enforcement began any sustained experimentation
43
with GIS crime-mapping technologies.
What is GIS crime-mapping technology? “A geographic information
system (GIS) is a set of computer-based tools that allow an analyst to
44
modify, visualize, query, and analyze geographic and tabular data.” GIS
includes the development of particular software programs that help
researchers “visualize data, assess human behavior over geographic
space, follow spatial patterns, validate theories, and examine how
45
geography affects crime and public safety.” GIS is not simply an
electronic version of a push-pin map. Instead, it allows for different
layers of information to be superimposed so that detailed information
46
about a location can be analyzed.

juvenile delinquency, exist because of the lack of a local social fabric where the structure and culture
of the community are strong enough to provide a concerted influence over local residents.” Chainey &
Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 335. In routine activities theory,
[p]lace is central . . . serving as the locus where motivated offenders come together with
desirable targets in the absence of crime suppressors (who include guardians, intimate
handlers, and place managers). This convergence of crime opportunities in space and time is
facilitated by various situational features, of both the physical and social variety, that
provide a context or setting that is more or less conducive to crime.
Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 220 (citations omitted). Defensible space theory focuses on the
environmental design of an area, seeking to strengthen “territoriality” and “natural surveillance” as a
means to protect individuals in the area. “Areas of low defensible space (such as large cities) were
thought to be more vulnerable to crime because in these areas feelings of ownership and community
spirit were not generated by residents.” In attempting to remedy those two weaknesses, the theory of
defensible space attempted to improve visibility (and thus “surveillability,”) as well as aesthetic
qualities in the physical environment. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 69–70.
42. Technically, “the first use of computerized crime mapping in applied crime analysis occurred
in the mid-1960s in St. Louis.” Harries, supra note 7, at 4, 92. In addition, one of the seminal research
areas that spurred the larger crime-mapping discipline was environmental criminology pioneered by
Paul and Patricia Brantingham. See, e.g., Environmental Criminology (Paul J. Brantingham &
Patricia L. Brantingham eds., 1981).
43. Peter M. Flannery, How to Pry with Maps: The Fourth Amendment Privacy Implications of
Governmental Wetland Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 29 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J.
447, 454–55 (2003).
44. Rachel Boba, Introductory Guide to Crime Analysis and Mapping 19 (2001); see also
Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 38 (“A GIS is a computer system for capturing, managing,
integrating, manipulating, analysing and displaying data which is spatially referenced to the Earth.”).
45. Ron Wilson & Kurt Smith, What is Applied Geography for the Study of Crime and Public
Safety?, Geography & Pub. Safety, Feb. 2008, at 1, 2.
46. Harries, supra note 7, at 92; Markovic & Stone, supra note 11, at 4 (“A common feature of
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GIS allows recorded crimes to be entered in a large database that
includes information regarding different types, times, and geographic
coordinates of crime, so that police administrators can study historic and
47
current patterns of crime in any location at any time. The database can
be searched for statistical information, can analyze unusual clusters of
crime, and can display the information on a recognizable map of the
area. If an administrator wants to know how many robberies occurred on
a particular street in the last week, month, or year, the administrator
simply searches for the proper information. If the administrator wants to
compare that street with robberies on other streets, she can do that as
well.
A jurisdiction that uses GIS to map, record, and analyze crime has
the ability to understand the actual level of reported criminal events in
any given area. This means that a jurisdiction can analyze crime patterns
48
49
and identify hotspots, redraw arbitrary district or policing boundaries,
connect with other jurisdictions to see how crime from one area affects
50
neighboring areas, and compare crime statistics across a jurisdiction or
51
among several jurisdictions.

all crime mapping systems is that the data are organized into layers. Think of the layers as a series of
transparencies that can be viewed in a variety of combinations. The user determines which layers to
make visible at any one time.”).
47. Markovic & Stone, supra note 11, at 2.
48. Katie Filbert, Targeting Crime in Hot Spots and Hot Places, Geography & Pub. Safety, Feb.
2008, at 4, 4–5 (“GIS and related mapping and analysis tools have been advancing to include
sophisticated statistics software that allows rigorous analysis of crime hot spots and testing against
random patterns and variation. In addition to statistical analysis, researchers use spatial analysis to
devise problem-solving approaches and reduce crime and disorder.”).
49. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 9 (“The power of GIS . . . dramatically simplifies the
time-consuming task of redistricting or adjusting boundaries in patrol areas.”); Christopher Bruce,
Districting and Resource Allocation: A Question of Balance, Geography & Pub. Safety, Jan. 2009, at 1, 1
(“[T]he ‘Bud-Shell Method’ of creating police districts . . . describes a police administrator who sits
down one night with a ‘six pack of Budweiser and a Shell station road map’ and uses a magic marker
to draw lines down major streets. If you have a major east-west artery and a major north-south
artery—voila!—you have four districts! Never mind that one contains mostly upper-class residential
housing and another contains a hospital, a high school, and a methadone clinic. It would probably be
too much to say that the ‘Bud-Shell Method’ was the predominant method of districting during the
first 90 percent of the 20th century . . . but until the advent of affordable desktop geographic
information system (GIS) software, the task was too difficult to accomplish any other way.”).
50. San Diego County’s Automated Regional Justice Information System became the first “multiagency” system in the country. It was later renamed San Diego County Regional Crime Mapping
Application for Public Safety (“MAPS”). See Julie Wartell, Crime MAPS: Evolution and Revolution,
7 Crime Mapping News, no. 4, 2007 at 1, 1; see also Thomas Rich, Mapping the Path to Problem
Solving, Nat’l Inst. Just. J., Oct. 1999, at 2, 4 (“In some areas of the country, law enforcement
agencies have established regional systems that merge crime and other police data from several,
typically adjacent, law enforcement agencies.”).
51. Markovic & Stone, supra note 11, at 8 (“A map of a police district can show which sectors are
experiencing an increase, and which a decrease, in any particular crime in the system. A map of a city
or state can show the equivalent patterns across several police districts.”).
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Police utilize GIS in both big cities and small towns. As of 2004,
ninety percent of police departments serving jurisdictions of 250,000 or
53
more residents used computerized mapping in some form.
Approximately sixty percent of agencies serving jurisdictions of 50,000 to
54
249,000 residents used computerized mapping. However, in jurisdictions
with less than 50,000 residents, only fourteen percent of police
55
56
departments used the technology. Encouraged by federal funding and
inspired by new computer programming and internet capabilities, more
57
police departments have begun to adopt GIS. Cheaper technologies
that merge data-collection methods with data-analytical methods have
58
made crime mapping possible for many jurisdictions.
Currently, GIS is used by police departments for tactical analysis,
criminal investigations, statistical record keeping, strategic planning, and
59
New criminology theories have
administrative management.
60
accompanied the adoption of GIS. Police departments have also created
crime-analysis divisions, which are staffed by professional crime
61
analysts. The rise of data-driven policing has led to a reprioritization of

52. See, e.g., Mark Sirois & William Galten, Crime Mapping News Spotlight: Johnson City Police
Department, 7 Crime Mapping News, no. 3, 2006 at 9, 9 (discussing Johnson City, Tennessee,
population 56,217, and the police department’s adoption of a GIS system in 2006).
53. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 154.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Funding was provided primarily by the National Institute of Justice’s Crime Mapping
Research Center (renamed the Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety Program in 2002). Chainey &
Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 3.
57. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 154.
58. See Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 215 (“Technological advances, primarily in computer
capabilities, are fundamental to recent analytical advances in the methods available for analyzing
place-based crime data. The advent of computer mapping applications and accompanying geographic
information systems (GIS) are crucial to being able to measure and represent the spatial relationships
in data. Perhaps the most powerful analytical tools emerging from GIS technologies are (1) flexible
spatial aggregation capabilities to facilitate the measurement of place-based crime and (2) simple
contiguity matrices for representing neighbor relationships between different areal units.”).
59. Boba, supra note 44, at 11–14.
60. Thomas R. O’Connor, Intelligence-Led Policing and Transnational Justice, 6 J. Inst. Just. &
Int’l Stud., 2006, at 233, 233 (“Intelligence-led policing . . . has been defined . . . as the application of
criminal intelligence analysis in order to facilitate crime reduction and prevention in a criminal
environment through effective policing strategies and external partnership projects.” (citing Jerry H.
Ratcliffe, Intelligence-Led Policing, Trends & Issues Crime & Crim. Just., Apr. 2003, at 1)).
61. See Olivier Ribaux et al., Forensic Intelligence and Crime Analysis, 2 L. Probability & Risk
47, 48, 54 (2003) (detailing the increased role of intelligence-led policing through the creation of crimeanalysis units, and describing the aim of crime analysis as “revealing problems, analysing their
potential causes and trying to foresee their development in order to determine where best to target
law enforcement resources . . . . The information itself is an integration of a broad variety of data
representing, for example, crime incidents, physical environments, socio-economic and demographic
features of a population, or physical traces.”); Willis et al., supra note 10, at 148 (“Crime analysts
collect, analyze, and map crime statistics to spot trends and help precinct commanders identify
underlying factors that explain crime incidents.”).
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62

resources and a restructuring of police management at the department
63
level. To the extent it has shifted the focus of police departments from a
reactive method of responding to crimes to a more proactive method of
64
managing societal disorder, it has changed the way police departments
do their jobs.

II. GIS in Practice
To understand GIS technology’s effect on the Fourth Amendment,
one must understand how GIS technologies work in practice. While
necessarily an oversimplified summary of a complicated academic and
professional discipline, this Subpart describes the basics of existing
crime-mapping technologies.
A. How Does GIS Work?
Though GIS software varies in sophistication, all GIS software can
65
run statistical programs that identify or isolate crime patterns. Many
66
software packages include a base map that provides digital street
67
information primarily based on U.S. Census data as well other
68
geographic information. Some software packages merely provide data
layers with street maps and a computer platform with which to
69
manipulate and study the data.

62. Cope, supra note 23, at 190 (“The process of intelligence led policing exemplifies concerns
with identifying, prioritizing and intervening to minimize risk. Intelligence can be understood as
information developed to direct police action.”).
63. “One of the most common objectives related to the [adopted crime-mapping] system was
identifying and quantifying crime hot spots, including specific addresses, streets, and sections of
neighborhoods.” Thomas Rich, Crime Mapping and Analysis by Community Organizations in
Hartford, Connecticut 8 (Mar. 2001).
64. Willis et al., supra note 10, at 172 (“[This shift in focus was based on the] belief that crime can
be reduced more effectively through proactive policing and an attack on underlying sources of
criminal activity than through arresting perpetrators after a crime has occurred.”).
65. The Office of Justice Programs in the United States Department of Justice has collected and
made available crime-mapping data from jurisdictions across the United States. See Office of Justice
Programs, Mapping and Analysis for Public Safety, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
nij/maps (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
66. Markovic & Stone, supra note 11, at 3 (“In general, crime mapping projects rely on digital
base maps created by government departments other than the police.”).
67. Harries, supra note 7, at 97 (“The history of geocoding is tied to efforts at the U.S. Census
Bureau to find ways of mapping data gathered across the country, address by address.”). Geocoding is
discussed later in this Part.
68. Keshav Bhattarai, A Comparative Analysis of Crime Mapping: TIGER Files vs. High
Resolution Data, 6 J. Inst. Just. & Int’l Stud., 2006, at 99, 99. (“Topologically Integrated Geographic
Encoding and Referencing (TIGER) files are digital street layers that are used in attributing census
information to upgrade census records, map updating, improving emergency response (E-911)
services. In addition, these layers are also used in cartographic visualization of the relative locations of
both man-made and natural features from these layers.”).
69. See Interview with Dr. Timothy Hart, supra note 8. Any errors in explanation are this
Author’s alone.
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Crime data is collected from police officers and other official
70
71
sources of reported crimes. A GIS system requires both tabular and
72
geographical data. Tabular data includes arrests, calls for service, or
73
other reports of crime. This data is inputted into the software system,
along with the time and place of the incident, a factual report of the
74
incident, and other relevant information. The crime data primarily
consists of “street crime,” as opposed to corporate crime, cyber crime, or
fraud. While underinclusive in terms of the total number of crimes that
occur, calls for service and arrests do provide an official and verifiable
75
76
record. The crime data is then layered on a parcel file, which includes
details of the area from property records and other local features (for
example, parks, rivers, highways, and shopping malls).
The result is a record of crimes reported by address and a mapping
system that provides the basic geographic layout of a jurisdiction.
Because each reported crime is identified with a particular place, the
77
data can be geocoded. “Geocoding” is a method of determining the
absolute spatial location (cross point of latitude and longitude) of an
object to locate it on a map. Locations of reported crime can be
geocoded by street center-line data, by parcel, or by address, depending
78
on the sophistication of the program.
70. See Boba, supra note 44, at 41.
71. See Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 8 (“Virtually everything we do as a police
department revolves around an address or location. All our dispatch records, incident reports,
citations, intelligence reports have a place, and all of these are records collected in the ordinary course
of business. GIS software allows mappers to use these computerised records of such things by
automatically placing the ‘pins’ on the map.” (citing the chief of police in Lincoln, Nebraska)).
72. “A variety of geographic data types may be used as a reference layer, though street files such
as the Census Bureau’s TIGER/Line files are the most commonly used.” Boba, supra note 44, at 42.
73. Willis et al., supra note 10, at 172 (“The primary sources of crime data were police incident
and arrest reports and CAD (computer-aided-dispatch) data.”). Calls for service are understood as
phone calls to police for assistance.
74. Mary Velasco & Rachel Boba, Manual of Crime Analysis Map Production 3 (2000)
(“Crime data and calls for service data are types of tabular data most frequently mapped in law
enforcement. For example, these data contain information primarily about crime incidents and calls
for service activity such as the type of activity, date, time, priority, and disposition.”).
75. Crime data is necessarily imperfect because many crimes are not reported, some crimes have
no geographical boundaries, and the data collection systems themselves are not error proof. See
Harries, supra note 7, at 77, 98–99; infra Part VI.
76. “A parcel file is a polygon layer used to keep track of lots, subdivisions, and ownership
information primarily for planning and tax purposes.” Boba, supra note 44, at 44.
77. Id. at 40 (“Geocoding is the process of bringing tabular and geographic data together based
on a common geographic unit of analysis. A geographic unit of analysis refers to a spatial characteristic
within the data that is necessary to locate it on a map such as address, zip code, beat, or grid. Tabular
data are contained in a table and are a list of records that, along with information about the record,
contain addresses or some other type of geographic variable.”).
78. The positional accuracy of the data is dependent on the level of precision used to geo-code
the data. For example, looking at a map based on an address that corresponds to the center line of a
road might be very different than looking at a map based on the center of a parcel of land. See
Interview with Dr. Timothy Hart, supra note 8.
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Finally, a professional crime analyst, trained in various software
programs, can examine the data to develop maps useful for crime
79
analysis. Maps may be quantitative or qualitative. Maps can display
80
different kinds of data: nominal, ordinal, ratio, and interval. “Statistical
maps use proportional symbols, pie charts, or histograms” to display the
81
quantitative aspects of the data. Choropleth maps “show discrete
distributions for particular areas such as [police] beats, precincts,
82
districts, counties, or census blocks.” Different types of maps, such as
83
isoline maps, surface maps, and linear maps, provide different
84
advantages and disadvantages to the analyst.
B. Applied GIS Technologies
In a few short years, GIS crime-mapping analysis has changed police
85
strategy and policies across the nation. This Subpart discusses three
specific applications of GIS technologies and highlights the promise and
problems in adapting these technologies in order to answer the highcrime area question.
1. CompStat
Perhaps the most well-publicized adoption of GIS technology
86
occurred in New York City with the creation of the CompStat system.

79. “Quantitative maps portray numerical information, such as numbers of crimes in an area or
crime rates. Qualitative maps show nonnumerical data like land use types or victim/offender
characteristics, such as male or female, juvenile or adult.” Harries, supra note 7, at 23.
80. “Nominal measurement names or labels items in unordered categories, such as race.” Id.
Ordinal measurement “classifies incidents, victim or offender characteristics, or some other attributes
(perhaps areas) according to rank.” Id. Ratio scales, such as distance in inches, feet, yards, etc., start at
zero and continue indefinitely. Id. “Interval scales show values but cannot show ratios between
values.” Id.
81. Id. at 24.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 24–25.
84. Id. at 40 (“[I]f we want to see the precise locations of burglaries for the last month, then we
use a point map of addresses of incidents. Or perhaps a city council member has asked the police
department for a map summarizing the number of incidents of graffiti per structure by city
neighborhoods. This calls for a choropleth map, with neighborhood boundaries making up the
geographic units. Links between victim and offender residences demand a linear representation. A
generalized picture of crime risk or incidents is seen best with an isoline or surface map, and census
information depicting the relationship between poverty and race can be shown using either a statistical
or choropleth map.”).
85. Adam Benforado, The Geography of Criminal Law, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 823, 860 (2010)
(“Computer technology now allows for the rapid production of maps that can be used not only to
implement more efficient targeted policing practices at the precinct level, but also to monitor the
effectiveness of different police policies. The result of such strategies is that officers tend not to be
placed evenly across the physical landscape; rather, they are focused in specific areas of high crime or
in areas deemed to require special protection.”).
86. Eli B. Silverman, With a Hunch and a Punch, 4 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 133, 144–45 (2007); Willis
et al., supra note 10, at 148. “CompStat” is an acronym for the NYPD computer and comparative
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In 1994, under the leadership of Police Chief William J. Bratton, the New
York Police Department (NYPD) adopted the CompStat system in a
87
way that revolutionized the policing structure of the city. CompStat
created an integrated data-management system for police statistics that
required weekly data updates, crime mapping, targeted police responses,
88
and an accountability mechanism that was primarily data driven.
Accompanying the adoption of CompStat were additional police
practices that targeted designated high-crime areas with more officers
89
and more aggressive policing techniques.
The CompStat philosophy focused on evaluating police
90
performance using crime data. While some have argued that CompStat
91
was more of a managerial change than a technological change, the daily
operations of the police department focused on “up-to-date
computerized crime data, crime analysis, and advanced crime mapping as
92
the bases for regularized, interactive crime strategy meetings.” Chief
Bratton proposed four goals to improve the police department: first,
police should collect and maintain accurate, timely information on crime
in the city; second, police should implement targeted police operations
focused on specific crime problems; third, police should be able to
rapidly deploy resources to target those specific crime problems; and
93
fourth, police should follow up and assess all decisions.
Crime mapping and data collection became a central organizing
principle for holding the police administrators and police officers
accountable for reducing crime rates. Day-to-day operations proceeded
as follows:
On a weekly basis, personnel from each of the Department’s 76
Precincts, 9 Police Service Areas and 12 Transit Districts compile[d] a
statistical summary of the week’s crime complaint, arrest and summons
activity, as well as a written recapitulation of significant cases, crime
patterns and police activities. This data, which include[d] the specific

statistics system. James J. Willis et al., Compstat in Practice: An In-depth Analysis of Three
Cities 2 n.1 (2003) (“There is some disagreement about what the acronym ‘Compstat’ actually means.
Former NYPD police commissioner William Bratton suggests that it stands for ‘computer-statistics
meetings,’ but Silverman attributes the term to ‘Compare Stats’—a computer filename. Some
commentators have collapsed these meanings and argue that Compstat refers to ‘computer
comparison statistics.’”).
87. Silverman, supra note 86, at 144–45; Willis et al., supra note 10, at 148.
88. Willis et al., supra note 86, at 48.
89. Id. at 64.
90. Id. at 2–4.
91. M. Todd Henderson et al., Predicting Crime, 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 15, 29 (2010) (“The process of
forecasting and evaluation [with CompStat] is less technical than managerial, as its use by the New
York Police Department (NYPD) and departments in other cities is primarily about framing data and
issues for analysis and discussion, instead of creating formulaic and computer analysis of data.”).
92. Silverman, supra note 86, at 144–45 (evaluating the effectiveness of the CompStat program in
New York City).
93. Willis et al., supra note 10, at 148.
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times and locations at which the crimes and enforcement activities took
place, [was] forwarded to the Chief of Department’s CompStat Unit
where it [was] collated and loaded into a city-wide database. The data
[was] analyzed by computer and a weekly CompStat Report [was]
generated. The CompStat Report capture[d] crime complaint and
arrest activity at the precinct, patrol borough, and city-wide levels, and
present[ed] a concise summary of these and other important
performance indicators. These data [were] presented on a week-todate, prior 30 days, and year-to-date basis with comparisons to
previous years’ activity. Precinct commanders and members of the
agency’s top management [could] easily discern emerging and
established crime trends as well as deviations and anomalies, and
[could] easily make comparisons between commands. Each precinct
94
[was] also ranked in each complaint and arrest category.

More relevant to the issue of studying high-crime areas, the NYPD
used the CompStat database to create a weekly, or sometimes daily,
snapshot of crime in New York City. The data was almost real time and
had a real-world effect on policing decisions, resource allocation, and
95
how the police department patrolled certain higher-crime neighborhoods.
In the twenty-five years since the NYPD adopted CompStat, New York
96
City’s crime rate dropped seventy-seven percent.
As of 2001, one third of the nation’s 515 largest police forces had
97
developed CompStat-inspired systems. The result, in both large and
small cities, is that police now have data about the crimes committed in
particular areas. Some of these police departments also have adopted
aggressive police techniques that use the data to target crime. For
example, in New York City, CompStat has been used in conjunction with
a “stop and frisk” policy that has resulted in hundreds of thousands of
98
police-citizen contacts. Using the CompStat data, the NYPD identified
“impact zones,” or areas with disproportionately high crime rates, and
adopted a policy of flooding these areas with police officers who had
94. Henderson et al., supra note 91, at 29–30.
95. Harries, supra note 7, at 80 (“[T]he CompStat database can be used to create a precinct map
depicting almost any combination of crime and/or arrest locations, crime hot spots, and other relevant
information. These visual presentations are a highly effective complement to the CompStat report,
since they permit precinct commanders and executive staff members to instantly identify and explore
trends, patterns, and possible solutions for crime and quality-of-life problems.”).
96. At the same time, there were concerns about the pressure on police to increase the number of
police stops while decreasing the number of arrests in order to manipulate crime statistics. See Graham
Rayman, The NYPD Police Tapes: Inside Bed-Stuy’s 81st Precinct, Village Voice, May 5, 2010, at 12.
97. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 264–66 (describing the use of CompStat in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania); Silverman, supra note 86, at 144 (citing a 1999 Police Foundation survey
for the National Institute of Justice); Columbia, South Carolina, Police Department Uses GIS for
Improved Policing, ARCWatch, July 2007, at 1, 1 [hereinafter ARCWatch] (“‘The crime rate for the
city of Columbia has fallen dramatically with the implementation of GIS mapping,’ says Chief H. Dean
Crisp Jr., police chief of Columbia. ‘It provides a basis for commanders and analysts to come together
and to identify and solve problems using what we call COMPSTAT, or computer statistics . . . . It has
helped produce the lowest crime rate that Columbia has seen within the past 15 years.’”).
98. Ray Rivera et al., A Few Blocks, 4 Years, 52,000 Police Stops, N.Y. Times, July 12, 2010, at A1.
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explicit encouragement to stop, frisk, and detain people they suspected
99
of criminal activity.
2. Official High-Crime Area Designations
The second example of GIS-driven policing involves jurisdictions
that have prospectively and publicly designated certain neighborhoods or
locations as official high-crime areas. In some jurisdictions, police
administrators have publicly released the crime data and announced that
certain areas are designated as high-crime areas. In other jurisdictions,
specified “hotspots” or “drug free zones” have been legislatively
100
approved and codified.
For example, the Miami-Dade County (Intercoastal Region)
101
proactively used GIS technology to restructure its policing services. In
an effort to take advantage of crime-mapping technology, the police
102
department reorganized its districts. Administrators divided the region
into one-by-one square mile sections and compared the crime patterns in
each section to the entire Intercoastal Region, focusing on the most
serious crimes—murder, rape, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and
103
other violent offenses. The one-square-mile sections were ranked in
order based on the number of serious crimes recorded in the past month.
The police administrators then designated the top ten percent of sections
104
as official high-crime areas. They informed police officers as well as
courts, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and local communities of the new
105
designations. So as not to have static designations, the listing of the top
106
ten percent sections was updated every month with new crime data. As

99. Id.; see infra Part IV.A.
100. For example, in Washington, D.C.,
[The Anti-Loitering/Drug Free Zone Act of 1996 (DC Law 11-270)] provides that, while a
Drug Free Zone is in effect, it will be unlawful for a group of two or more persons to
congregate in a public space or property in that area for the purpose of participating in the
use, purchase or sale of illegal drugs. A Drug Free Zone may be established by the Chief of
Police, provided it meets certain criteria, particularly that there have been a disproportionately
high number of drug-related crimes in that area. The Anti-Loitering/Drug Free Zone will
last no more than 240 hours (10 days), and the area will be clearly identified, with signs
posted along the perimeter, as well as within the zone.
See Drug Free Zones, D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep’t (Sept. 18, 2011, 8:23 PM), http://mpdc.dc.gov/
mpdc/cwp/view,a,1238,q,542244,mpdcNav_GID,1541.asp.
101. Glenn Theobald, Chief Legal Counsel, Miami-Dade Police Dep’t, Presentation at the Tenth
Annual Crime Mapping Conference (Aug. 2009).
102. Tucson, Arizona, a city of 200 square miles and with a population of 500,000, did the same
type of redistricting. See Autumn Kistler, Tucson Police Officers Redraw Division Boundaries to
Balance Their Workload, Geography & Pub. Safety, Jan. 2009, at 3 (detailing how the police
department used GIS Mapping to divide Tucson into one-quarter of a square mile squares).
103. Theobald, supra note 101.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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a result of this restructuring and of additional police resources directed to
the identified areas, crime dropped approximately fifty percent in the
107
region.
3. Identifying Hotspots
A third application of GIS technology is the identification of crime
“hotspots.” A hotspot is an area that has a statistically higher rate of
108
crime than an average or random area in the same jurisdiction. A
hotspot can be a single address, cluster of addresses, block, intersection,
109
or an even larger area. It could be created by particular environmental
110
concerns or by particular individuals or groups. Hotspots do not
necessarily correspond to set neighborhood boundaries, patrol districts,
111
or census tracts. While there is no agreed-upon definition of an official
hotspot, at a minimum the area should have a geographic boundary and
112
thresholds against which the crime rates are measured. For example,

107. Id. Such designated official areas raise several problems. For example, without oversight, a
data-driven approach creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: the increase in police presence in a specific
high-crime area results in more arrests in that area. With more arrests taking place, analysts have more
evidence that it is a higher-crime area, which means more targeting and more officers. One can create
a permanent high-crime area with such a self-perpetuating, numbers-driven system.
108. James G. Cameron, Spatial Analysis Tools for Identifying Hotspots, in Mapping Crime:
Understanding Hot Spots 35, 35 (John E. Eck et al. eds., 2005) (“A central concern of hot spot
analyses of crime is assessing the degree of spatial randomness observed in the data. Most of the
available tools provide different ways of determining whether the underlying pattern is uniform over
space or whether significant clusters or other spatial patterns exist, which are not compatible with
spatial randomness.”).
109. Taylor, supra note 40, at 3; see also John E. Eck, Crime Hot Spots: What They Are, Why We
Have Them, and How to Map Them, in Mapping Crime, supra note 108, at 1, 8; Harries, supra note 7,
at 113–15 (“[In one case, hotspots were limited to] [n]ot more than one standard linear street block
(one side of the street only). Not more than half a block from an intersection. No closer to another hot
spot than one block.”).
110. Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 222–23 (“[A] crime hot spot is a location, or small area within
an identifiable boundary, with a concentration of criminal incidents. These chronic crime places where
crime is concentrated at high rates over extended periods of time may be analogous to the small
percentage of chronic offenders who are responsible for a large percentage of crime.”).
111. Adding a level of complexity to the analysis, if there are hotspots, there necessarily must be
“cool spots,” many of which may be in close geographic proximity to the hotspot cluster of crime. Eck,
supra note 109, at 4 (“Although hot places often are concentrated within areas, they often are
separated by other places with few or no crimes.”). See id. at 2 (“Though no common definition of the
term hot spot of crime exists, the common understanding is that a hot spot is an area that has a greater
than average number of criminal or disorder events, or an area where people have a higher than
average risk of victimization. This suggests the existence of cool spots—places or areas with less than
the average amount of crime or disorder. It also suggests that some hot spots may be hotter than
others; that is, they vary in how far above average they are.”).
112. Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 223 (“Minimally, crime hot spots share the key features of a
boundary and criminal events within that boundary (e.g., 911 calls, offense reports). Perhaps the
easiest means of identifying hot spots is to partition a jurisdiction into a fixed set of boundaries (e.g.,
square grid cells, census block groups, or some other boundary set) and to develop a set of rules (a
“rule base”) using threshold values. . . . Suppose that the boundaries are square grid cells of a fixed
size and origin. Then a rule for hot spot initiation at any grid cell might be the following: If the cell
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one study of hotspots in Minneapolis, Minnesota “found that 3.3[%] of
street addresses and intersections in [the city] generated 50.4[%] of all
113
dispatched police calls for service.”
As an academic discipline, scientific statistical models are used on a
regular basis to create a pattern analysis that shows a nonrandom event
114
in space and time that is statistically significant to study. Scholars and
practitioners are now able to isolate and identify crime patterns in a
115
reliable and predictable manner. Using these scientific methods, police
116
Hotspot identification
administrators can isolate specific trends.
increasingly has led to a reallocation of resources targeting specific crime
117
problems in specific areas.
These examples are just three of the potential uses of GIS
118
technology. As will be discussed in the next Part, these developments
present equally new and uncertain challenges to existing law.

III. Fourth Amendment High-Crime Areas
This Part addresses the post-Wardlow use of the term “high-crime
areas,” analyzing federal and state cases that rely on the term. After a
brief overview of the legal context, several themes are distilled from the
cases raising a concern with the generality and malleability of the term.
These concerns highlight the importance of a particularized and targeted
approach to making crime patterns relevant for a Fourth Amendment
analysis.
While crime-mapping technology and GIS systems have been used
by police departments for years, courts have all but ignored the
development. In Fourth Amendment hearings, courts have relied on a
were not a hot spot in the previous time period but the number of crimes of a designated type now
exceeds a specified threshold value, then the cell becomes a hot spot during the current period.”);
Harries, supra note 7, at 112.
113. Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 221; see also David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic
Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 Val. U. L. Rev. 449, 459 (1997)
(recognizing areas of hotspots as target areas for police surveillance).
114. Ned Levine, CrimeStat III, 7 Crime Mapping News, no. 2, 2005 at 8; Rich, supra note 50, at 7
(discussing STAC technologies).
115. See Anselin et al., supra note 7, at 223; Harries, supra note 7, at 112.
116. Hotspots are not limited to urban environments. Instead,
a hotspot represents an area of high crime concentration, relative to the distribution of
crime across the whole region of interest. This means that regardless of whether crime
patterns are being studied across a rural, urban, or suburban area, the area of high crime
concentration relative to the general pattern of crime across the whole area will stand out as
the problem crime area.
Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 147–48.
117. David Weisburd & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder, and Fear,
593 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 42, 54 (2004) (“A series of randomized field trials shows that
policing that is focused on hot spots can result in meaningful reductions in crime and disorder . . . .”).
118. See, e.g., Kate J. Bowers et al., Prospective Hot-Spotting: The Future of Crime Mapping?,
44 Brit. J. Criminology 641, 642 (2004) (analyzing predictive crime mapping of crimes).
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protean understanding of high-crime areas without any grounding in the
119
empirical data developed by GIS systems. In the years since Wardlow,
there have been more than one thousand federal and state cases that
have used the term “high-crime area” in the context of Fourth
120
Amendment reasonable suspicion. Yet only a few courts have addressed
121
the issue of defining “high-crime area” with any sustained scrutiny.
Even fewer have addressed the empirical data the government possessed
122
about the area at the time of the stop. Crime maps are rarely used and
123
crime analyst reports are almost never introduced in court.
Thus, decades after the Supreme Court’s first use of “high-crime
124
area” in Adams v. Williams, the term has become a “familiar talismanic
litany” often uttered and usually conclusive in a reasonable suspicion
125
determination. High-crime areas have thus become a significant, yet
undefined, factor in determining reasonable suspicion for a police stop.
A. Legal Context of the High-Crime Area Question
The Fourth Amendment “impose[s] a standard of ‘reasonableness’
upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including law
enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and security of
126
individuals against arbitrary invasions.” Three types of police-citizen
encounters can occur: (1) consensual encounters, which require no
objective level of suspicion; (2) investigative detentions, or stops, which
must be preceded by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal

119. A few courts have in fact rejected the requirement of introducing crime statistics to determine
a high-crime area. See, e.g., United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005).
120. This number comes from the Author’s search of Westlaw and Lexis and includes unpublished
but reported opinions.
121. The exceptions include United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 222–23 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53–54 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d
213, 218 (3d Cir. 2004) (Smith, J., concurring); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
122. In Wardlow, the Court had been provided the data to determine high- and low-crime areas in
Chicago and essentially sidestepped analysis of the issue. See Amicus Curiae Brief of the National
Association of Police Organizations et al. in Support of Petitioner at 7, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.
119 (2000) (No. 98-1036), 1999 WL 451226 [hereinafter Wardlow Amici Curiae Brief].
123. However, see United States v. Wright, in which the defense introduced Boston Police
Department reports to demonstrate the area was not designated by the police department as an area
of heightened concern. 485 F.3d 45, 49 (1st Cir. 2007).
124. 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972).
125. Curtis v. United States, 349 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. Ct. App. 1975) (“[W]e eschew the notion that
the above facts assume added significance because they happen to have occurred in a high crime area.
This familiar talismanic litany, without a great deal more, cannot support an inference that appellant
was engaged in criminal conduct.”).
126. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
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activity; and (3) full searches and arrests, which must be supported by
127
probable cause.
The high-crime area analysis generally arises only in the second type
of encounter. Following the well-known Terry v. Ohio framework, a
police officer may briefly detain a suspect if the officer has a reasonable
suspicion, supported by particularized and articulable facts, that criminal
128
activity is afoot. Reasonable suspicion is an objective standard, and
reviewing courts assess reasonable suspicion based on the “totality of
129
circumstances,” including, when relevant, the crime level of the area.
While the character of the area can influence the totality analysis, the
same objective standard of reasonable suspicion is assumed to apply in
130
all neighborhoods and to all people. In other words, the reasonable
suspicion legal standard in a high-crime area should be the same as in a
non high-crime area.
B. The Supreme Court and High-Crime Areas
For almost forty years, the Supreme Court has relied on an
understanding that the crime level of an area can influence the
131
reasonable suspicion determination. Yet only rarely has the Court been
presented with crime statistics generated from crime-mapping programs
132
or official designations labeling a certain area. In no case has the
Supreme Court analyzed crime data or the implications of crimemapping technologies. However, a comparison of two cases provides

127. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98 (1983).
128. 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968).
129. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (“[O]fficers are not required to ignore the
relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently
suspicious to warrant further investigation.”); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)
(“[H]istorical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to
reasonable suspicion or to probable cause.”); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); United
States v. McKie, 951 F.2d 399, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“[Courts] look to the record as a whole to
determine what facts were known to the officer and then consider whether a reasonable officer in
those circumstances would have been suspicious.”).
130. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 944 (Pa. 2009); see United States v. Black, 525
F.3d 359, 361, 367, 370 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J., dissenting) (“By creating zones of lower
constitutional protection in poor neighborhoods, the majority, albeit unwittingly, engages in a blatant
display of class discrimination of the basest variety. It has never been my understanding of the Fourth
Amendment that those with less means likewise receive less constitutional protection as a result of
their plight. It is written into the very fiber of our Constitution that the protections granted therein
apply equally to all Americans, regardless of whether they are returning home to the grandest of
mansions or the humblest of shanties. Such a broad reading of ‘reasonable articulable suspicion’
significantly limits the freedom of people who happen to be in an area deemed ‘high crime.’ Surely, the
Constitution cannot support such an arbitrary and discriminatory result.”).
131. See Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. 448, 448 (2008); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
132. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124–25.
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some guidance as to how the Court might approach this issue in the
future.
In Illinois v. Wardlow, the high-crime area designation of a stop
became one of only two factors the Supreme Court used in its totality of
133
circumstances analysis. The Court held that “unprovoked flight” in a
high-crime area justified the reasonable suspicion of the officers
134
conducting the stop of Mr. Wardlow. The finding that the area was a
high-crime area was based on an officer’s testimony that he was part of a
135
special operations division focusing on “heavy narcotics trafficking.”
Officer Nolan testified that he was part of a four-car caravan driving
through Chicago’s 11th Police District when he observed Mr. Wardlow
136
holding a white plastic bag near 4035 West Van Buren Street.
The issue of whether the area surrounding this location was, in fact,
a high-crime area or an “area known for heavy narcotics trafficking” had
137
been contested during the state court proceedings. The Appellate
Court of Illinois found the record too vague to determine whether the
area was a high-crime area:
From the record before us, we cannot discern the precise location of
the area known by the officers to have a high incidence of narcotics
trafficking. After he testified that he noticed defendant at 4035 West
Van Buren, Officer Nolan was asked why he went to that area. He
responded that it was one of the areas in the 11th District that had
“high narcotics traffic.” His testimony indicates only that the officers
were headed somewhere in the general area. There was no evidence
that the officers were investigating the specific area where defendant
had been standing or that any of the police cars had stopped at that
location or that defendant had any basis for believing that police were
interested in his activity.
Officer Nolan testified that he was “caravaning” down West Van
Buren when he noticed defendant. He did not testify that the officers
were targeting 4035 West Van Buren because it was known to be a
location where drugs were sold. From the evidence elicited at the
hearing on the motion to suppress, it appears that the officers were
simply driving by, on their way to some unidentified location, when
they noticed defendant standing at 4035 West Van Buren. The record
here is simply too vague to support the inference that defendant was in
a location with a high incidence of narcotics trafficking or, for that

133. Id. at 124.
134. Id.; see, e.g., Nelson, supra note 16, at 511; Amy D. Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth
Amendment Apartheid, 32 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 383, 384 (2001); Walsh, supra note 16, at 883.
135. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (“Nolan and Harvey were among eight officers in a four-car caravan
that was converging on an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, and the officers anticipated
encountering a large number of people in the area, including drug customers and individuals serving as
lookouts.”).
136. Id. at 121–22.
137. People v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 67 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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matter, that defendant’s flight was related to his expectation of police
138
focus on him.

The Supreme Court of Illinois disagreed with this determination,
concluding that Officer Nolan’s “uncontradicted and undisputed
testimony, which was accepted by the trial court, was sufficient to
139
establish that the incident occurred in a high-crime area.”
Wardlow thus presented the Supreme Court with the opportunity to
address how to define “high-crime areas” in a Fourth Amendment case.
Crime statistics and crime-mapping techniques were introduced by the
140
parties. As one amicus brief stated:
The reputation of an area for having substantial criminal activity can
be based, not only on the objective knowledge and experience of police
officers, but on verifiable and quantifiable data. Sophisticated data
collection, geographical computer and other mapping, and detailed
geographical analysis systems have all become an essential part of
crime prevention.
....
The use of geographical factors in policing is the subject of extensive
ongoing studies. In conducting these studies, researchers rely on
computer mapping as a fundamental tool when working with
geographical data. Aided by advancements in technology, computer
mapping, which can encompass the production of a simple pin map or
the complex interactive mapping for detailed geographical analysis, has
141
become an essential part of crime prevention in larger cities.

But despite the invitation to embrace GIS crime-mapping technologies,
the Supreme Court declined to address the issue.
One reason why the Court might have avoided the issue is that the
crime data did not necessarily support its ultimate conclusion. As I have
142
argued elsewhere, the data presents a more complicated picture of
crime in the area of Mr. Wardlow’s stop. For example, while the majority
opinion relies on testimony that the area was in a high narcotics
trafficking area, there were no statistics on drug arrests presented to the
143
Supreme Court. Further, nothing Mr. Wardlow was doing at 12:35 pm
144
holding a white plastic bag necessarily indicated narcotics trafficking.
The crime statistics presented to the Court demonstrated that District 11
had the highest murder rate of Chicago’s twenty-five districts, and a quite

138. Id.
139. People v. Wardlow, 701 N.E.2d 484, 486 (Ill. 1998).
140. See Wardlow Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 122, at *7.
141. Id. at *7, *20.
142. E.g., Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 22, at 1601–02 (describing the courts’ interpretations
of the area of Mr. Wardlow’s stop).
143. Wardlow Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 122, at *25 n.27 (“These statistics do not list drug
offenses.”).
144. In fact, Mr. Wardlow did not have narcotics in his possession, nor was he engaged in narcotics
trafficking. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121–22 (2000).
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high rate for sexual assault and robberies, but was ranked right in the
middle of the twenty-five districts for crime overall. The relevance of the
number of murders or sexual assaults to an officer’s observation of a man
holding a plastic bag is not obvious. Finally, while crime statistics were
presented on a district level—a district that encompassed 98,000
146
people —there was no specific information about the 4035 West Van
147
Buren address or any particularized complaints about that location.
There appears, thus, to be a substantial disconnect between the existing
crime data and any argument for how that data should have affected the
reasonable suspicion of the officer observing Mr. Wardlow.
The Court addressed a similar issue in Pennsylvania v. Dunlap, in
which Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy
148
dissented from a denial of a writ of certiorari. In a homage to the noir
fiction genre, the Chief Justice highlighted the importance of the
149
character of the neighborhood in justifying a police stop:
North Philly, May 4, 2001. Officer Sean Devlin, Narcotics Strike
Force, was working the morning shift. Undercover surveillance. The
neighborhood? Tough as a three-dollar steak. Devlin knew. Five years
on the beat, nine months with the Strike Force. He’d made fifteen,
twenty drug busts in the neighborhood.
Devlin spotted him: a lone man on the corner. Another approached.
Quick exchange of words. Cash handed over; small objects handed
back. Each man then quickly on his own way. Devlin knew the guy
wasn’t buying bus tokens. He radioed a description and Officer Stein
picked up the buyer. Sure enough: three bags of crack in the guy’s
pocket. Head downtown and book him. Just another day in the
150
office.

In dissenting from the denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Roberts
signaled his disapproval of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s holding
that a single, isolated drug transaction in a high-crime area was
151
insufficient to justify a stop of the suspect. Relying in part on the
officer’s specific knowledge of the area as well as the officer’s specific

145. Wardlow Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 122, at *7 (“Chicago Police District 11, where the
Respondent fled from the police, is such a high crime area. In 1997, District 11 had a higher overall
total crime rate than 13 of the 25 police districts, roughly an equal crime rate to two of the districts,
and a lower crime rate than 9 of the districts. When broken down further, this data reveals that in
1997, District 11 had the highest number of murders and robberies, and the second highest number of
criminal sexual assaults and aggravated assaults, of all the police districts in Chicago.”).
146. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 137 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 138 (“[The officer’s] terse testimony is most noticeable for what it fails to reveal.”).
148. 129 S. Ct. 448, 448 (2008).
149. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy would have found probable cause on the facts
before them. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 671 (Pa. 2007).
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experience in making arrests in the area, Chief Justice Roberts reasoned
152
that such information should constitute probable cause to arrest.
While there remains an open question whether fifteen or twenty
arrests in the general vicinity of an area is sufficiently particularized to
153
make suspicious what Officer Devlin observed, there is in fact a closer
nexus between what he knew about the area and what he saw.
Relevantly, Officer Devlin’s purpose for being there was that the
Philadelphia Police Department’s Narcotics Strike Force had authorized
154
Unlike in
a “plain-clothes surveillance” for a particular corner.
Wardlow, in which the Narcotics Strike Force was driving through the
streets and happened to see Mr. Wardlow on West Van Buren, Officer
Devlin had staked out a particularized location with a particularized
crime problem because of an official decision of his police
155
administrators. Further, the expected type of criminal activity matched
156
what Officer Devlin actually saw—suspected narcotics dealing.
In Dunlap, as opposed to Wardlow, an understanding of crime
patterns made the officer’s observations more reasonable because the
particularized knowledge of the area was tied to the particularized
suspicion of the observed person. These two cases help frame the federal
and state court approaches to the issue.
C. An Overview of Federal and State Cases Addressing
High-Crime Areas
Most federal and state courts that have addressed the high-crime
area issue post-Wardlow employ the term without much sustained
157
analysis. In many cases, the “area” is not defined by geographic

152. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. at 448–49.
153. Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective
Dimensions of Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 751, 754–56 (2010).
154. Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671 (No.
07-1486), 2008 WL 2305800, at *2.
155. Dunlap, 129 S. Ct. at 448.
156. The debate that framed Pennsylvania v. Dunlap continued in the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania with Dunlap itself being clarified by Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 943–44
(Pa. 2009).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 594 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Cincinnati police officers
were on uniform patrol in Over-the-Rhine, a high-crime, high-drug area just north of downtown
Cincinnati . . . .”); United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) (justifying a stop
based on a hand-to-hand transaction between the defendant and his brother-in-law in an area “wellknown for narcotics activity—particularly for street-level, hand-to-hand drug dealing”); United States
v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 368, 371 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that a car parked under a viaduct on
private property was suspicious enough to justify a stop where the officer described the “location as a
‘hot spot’—a high-crime area that was the site of drug sales, prostitution, and car theft”); United States
v. Ruidiaz, 529 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2008) (notorious high-crime area used without explanation or
analysis as one factor for reasonable suspicion); United States v. Taylor, 511 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2007)
(officer’s knowledge of high-crime area used as a factor to justify seizure of defendant); State v.
Collins, 890 So. 2d 616, 619 (La. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Moore, 853 A.2d 903, 907 (N.J. 2004)
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location or connected to a particular type of crime. Only a handful of
159
courts have referenced any statistical data for crime patterns in an area.
A few courts have narrowed the area to a more particularized address or
160
location, usually in keeping with the initial justifications for police
161
suspicion. While some courts have expressed concern or confusion
162
about what exactly a high-crime area is or how it should be weighed in

(“[Officer] had made numerous drug arrests in the same neighborhood, which was known to the police
for heavy drug trafficking”); Commonwealth v. Blair, 860 A.2d 567, 574 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004);
Commonwealth v. McClease, 750 A.2d 320, 323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000); Riley v. Commonwealth,
412 S.E.2d 724, 726 (Va. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Morgan, 539 N.W.2d 887, 891–92 (Wis. 1995).
158. See, e.g., United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
appellant had conceded the particular intersection at issue was a “‘high crime’ area where officers
expect nightly calls regarding robberies or shots fired”).
159. Compare United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 793 (2005) (rejecting the claim that “the
government must produce ‘specific data’ establishing that a location is a ‘high-crime area’”), with
United States v. Diaz-Juarez, 299 F.3d 1138, 1145 (9th Cir. 2002) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (“Agent
Rodriguez testified that Tierra del Sol Road ‘was located in a high-crime area,’ relying on his
speculative observations . . . . This testimony was a far cry from the ‘specific data’ required to support
the assertion that the stop took place in a ‘high-crime’ area.”).
160. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he Value-Lodge Motel in
Charlotte, North Carolina, was well known to officers of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police
Department as a location for violent crime and drug trafficking.”); United States v. See, 574 F.3d 309,
311 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[The officer] testified that Cedar Estates is a high-crime area and that . . . due to a
series of recent robberies in the area, he was instructed to pay ‘special attention’ to the area and to
remain alert for ‘[l]oud music from vehicles, loud music from the apartment building, persons loitering,
the areas of drug related activity, suspicious person, persons, that is loitering that are not really
residents or visiting residents in that area.’”); United States v. Am, 564 F.3d 25, 27, 30 (1st Cir. 2009)
(“[Officers were] patrolling in a marked police cruiser a high-crime area of Lynn, Massachusetts,
where there were frequent shootings and where the Department was conducting increased patrols as
part of its ongoing gang suppression strategy . . . . The stop occurred in a location of known gang
violence based on suspicion that Am was engaged in criminal activity related to his gang membership,
namely carrying a weapon for protection from rival gangs.”); United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 361,
365 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[The arrest occurred in] a ‘high-crime’ neighborhood . . . [and the testifying
detective] knew the neighborhood to be a high-crime area, and he had made numerous arrests for
drugs and trespassing in Mosby Court in his 12 years as a police officer.”); United States v. McCoy,
513 F.3d 405, 407, 412 (4th Cir. 2008) (limiting the definition of high-crime areas to grocery stores
because “according to some Loudoun County police officers, nearly half of all the drug deals in
Loudoun County occur in public parking lots of grocery stores and other retail stores”).
161. See, e.g., United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009) (“According to the
officers, that house was at an intersection that had a history of criminal activity.”); United States v.
Clarkson, 551 F.3d 1196, 1198 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[M]onitoring a residence in Salt Lake City, Utah, due
to suspected criminal conduct involving narcotics dealing, violent crime, prostitution, and gang activity
[led to a stop based on traffic violations stemming from sighting of car at that location].”); United
States v. Pearce, 531 F.3d 374, 377 (6th Cir. 2008) (“This special police detail was intended to address a
recently increased level of criminal activity—particularly narcotics trafficking—in the area, which had
been evidenced by a homicide shooting near the Deli a few days earlier.”).
162. In United States v. Wright, Judge Lipez, in dissent, analyzed the lack of empirical data
presented in the high-crime area claim:
The empirical evidence in the record also fails to connect the officers’ general perceptions
about high levels of crime in the area to the specific time and location of Wright’s arrest, or
show that firearms crimes were of particular concern during that period. Defense counsel
requested incident reports from the Boston Police Department for all violent crimes
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the totality of circumstances, only a few federal courts of appeals have
explicitly addressed the empirical basis for and constitutional problems
163
Unsurprisingly, courts have developed different
with the term.
164
standards and different solutions to resolve the issue.
From a review of the cases, three themes emerge. First, a reference
to a high-crime area weighs in favor of finding of reasonable suspicion. In
practical terms this means that the same activity in one neighborhood,
165
but not in another, may rise to the level of reasonable suspicion. On
166
or
occasion, courts have even considered “known crime areas”
167
to weigh in favor of reasonable
“medium-to-high crime areas”
suspicion. Second, an individual’s presence in high-crime area alone is

involving a firearm that occurred in October and early November 2004 within 1,000 feet of
the location of Wright’s arrest. Thirteen incidents were listed, but the ten available reports
showed only two episodes (on October 12 and October 19) in which armed individuals had
threatened random individuals on the street. In addition, although the Department typically
prepared biweekly reports and maps showing “hot spots” throughout the city, no statistics
and maps were generated between August 31 and November 8—the date of Wright’s
arrest—because the format of the Department’s data collection was being revamped during
that period. Defense counsel reported in an affidavit that the two most recent such reports,
from August 2004, showed that the nearest hot spots were 1.5 and more than 2 miles from
the Blue Hill Avenue location of Wright’s arrest.
582 F.3d 199, 222–23 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J. dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
163. See Black, 525 F.3d at 367; United States v. Wright, 485 F.3d 45, 53 (1st Cir. 2007); United
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216–19 (3rd Cir. 2004); United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d
1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring).
164. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 22, at 1590–92.
165. For example, in Shelton v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
distinguished a long line of cases justifying Fourth Amendment seizures based on hand-to-hand
transactions, because the observed activity did not take place in a high-crime area. See 929 A.2d 420,
423 (D.C. 2007). This means that the very same activity—for example, receiving an object in return for
money—may be justification for a stop in a high-crime area, but not in a non high-crime area.
166. See United States v. Luqman, 522 F.3d 613, 619 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[D]uring the period from
August 2004 until August 2005, only 24 prostitution arrests were made in an area several square miles
in size surrounding the North Hill neighborhood, and only six of these arrests were in the immediate
vicinity of Luqman’s arrest. Moreover, this data was confirmed by the government’s concession at oral
argument that North Hill is not a high prostitution area. Regardless of what Officer Donohue may
have claimed at trial, it is unclear what basis he had for viewing North Hill as rife with prostitution.”).
Compare id. at 615 n.1 (known prostitution area distinguished from a high prostitution area), with id.
at 618 (Clay, J. dissenting) (“Luqman was not arrested in an area noted for a high incidence of
prostitution activity. Indeed, data introduced by the prosecution at trial demonstrates that over a one
year period, only six prostitution arrests occurred in the vicinity of Luqman’s arrest. Nevertheless, the
majority now holds that we must treat the neighborhood where Luqman was arrested as a ‘high
prostitution’ area merely because a police officer tells us that it is.”).
167. United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (using the fact that stop occurred
in a medium-to-high crime area as a factor in the totality of circumstances to frisk as suspect for
weapons); see also United States v. Swain, 324 F. App’x. 219, 223 (4th Cir. 2009) (unreported) (“[T]he
district court considered evidence that Trooper Davis had personally made drug buys within two
hundred yards of the Beaver Apartments and that other officers had arranged for controlled buys
either at the apartment building or in the general area. Statistical data also supported a finding that the
area was disposed toward criminal activity (it ranked fourteenth of seventy-five areas in the city in
terms of serious crimes).”).
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not sufficient for reasonable suspicion. Third, courts on occasion have
cautioned about the consequences of allowing the term to “tip the
169
totality scales” in a finding of reasonable suspicion.
For our purpose, two overarching conclusions can be drawn from
this review of the case law. First, the elevation of “high-crime area” to
one of only two factors in the totality of circumstances considered in
Wardlow has heightened the term’s importance in subsequent cases.
Whether examined or not, its presence tips the scales to a finding of
reasonable suspicion. This raises a host of fairness concerns, including
170
issues of race, class, and place that will be discussed in later Parts.
Second, the cases show that the term “high-crime area” can be viewed
with different levels of specificity with regards to type of crime and
location. Connecting back to the Wardlow and Dunlap analysis, the level
of specific knowledge about particular crime patterns (for instance,
number of arrests) in a particular area (for example, an identifiable
corner) distinguishes the cases. When narrowed to a particularized area
and a particularized crime, crime patterns can be quite useful in adding
to the reasonable suspicion analysis. As we will discuss in the next Part,
this is precisely the type of information that GIS crime-mapping
technology can now provide.

168. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 606 F.3d 964, 967–68 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding suppression
of a firearm and ammunition recovered from the defendant and discounting the assertion that the
arrest occurred in a high-crime area because there was no allegation of criminal activity); United
States v. Neely, 564 F.3d 346, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that fumbling for trunk switch in a highcrime area, without more, was not enough to justify a full search of the defendant’s car); United States
v. Hughes, 517 F.3d 1013, 1015–18 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that the claim that an area was a high-crime
area due to “reputed narcotics trafficking” was not enough to create reasonable suspicion).
169. United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 221 (1st Cir. 2009) (Lipez, J. dissenting) (“Establishing
a link between the defendant’s observed conduct and the high crime area designation is essential in
protecting individual rights because of the decisive impact of that designation in the reasonable
suspicion calculus. When it applies, every observed act is viewed through a more suspicious lens.”);
United States v. Black, 525 F.3d 359, 367 (4th Cir. 2008) (Gregory, J. dissenting) (“[I]t is an
unfortunate reality that, in America today, high-crime areas are frequently poor. Thus, by making
much of the fact that the events of this case transpired in a ‘high-crime’ area—notably near public
housing projects—the majority embarks on the treacherous path of lowering the Fourth Amendment
protection afforded to people in low-income areas.”); Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 941 A.2d 671, 681
(Pa. 2007) (Saylor, J. concurring) (“[I]n the absence of some particular circumstance that does not
substantially overlap with legitimate behavior, I do not believe that the high-drug-activity location
factor should be given the sort of weight which would tip the totality scales in favor of finding probable
cause to arrest.”).
170. See, e.g., Angela Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 425, 427–32 (1997)
(discussing the discriminatory nature of pretextual traffic stops); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 333, 333–93 (1998) (discussing the Fourth Amendment in the racial
context); William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1795, 1798 (1998) (recognizing
that differences in policing crack and powder cocaine offenses, even if in actuality based on class
differences, appear to be based on race differences, which undermines the normative force of drug
laws).
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IV. The Intersection of Crime-Mapping Technologies
and the Fourth Amendment
Officially drawn high-crime areas are a central problem emerging
from the intersection of crime-mapping technologies and the Fourth
Amendment. These areas can be identified areas determined through a
171
CompStat data system or predesignated areas like those in Miami172
The areas can be publicized or
Dade (Intercoastal Region).
unpublicized, but share the common factor that they are official,
geographically defined areas known to police administrators.
Take, as an example, a scenario similar to the Wardlow case.
Assume, hypothetically, that Mr. Wardlow was standing in a publicized,
officially designated high-crime area when the police stopped him. At the
suppression hearing, in an effort to justify the Terry stop, the prosecution
presents evidence to show the area was officially designated as in the top
173
ten percent for crime in the jurisdiction. Assuming this data is accurate,
how does the fact that the area is an officially designated high-crime area
affect the law enforcement officer patrolling the streets? How does it
affect a court’s determination of reasonable suspicion at a suppression
hearing? How does it change existing Fourth Amendment doctrine?
Finally, how does it affect the liberty of individuals who are living in
designated high-crime areas? This Part addresses the constitutional
consequences when police administrators draw high-crime area lines,
creating officially designated high-crime areas.
A. Effect on Law Enforcement
Assuming the police officer was aware of the high-crime area
designation, it would be reasonable to rely on this information in making
a Terry stop. In fact, it might be unreasonable for an officer not to take
174
into account this objective factual information. Since allowing empirical
data to influence a police officer’s reasonable suspicion determination
makes that determination more objectively reasonable, such an approach
would be consistent with existing Fourth Amendment practice and
175
176
jurisprudence. Location has always mattered in policing. More

171. See supra Part II.B.1.
172. See supra Part II.B.2.
173. A threshold question is whether the data is accurate. While there are concerns about data
collection and analysis in this area, see infra Part VI, assuming the police officer relied in good faith on
the administrative determination of the area, it would be hard for any court to fault this reliance.
174. There would be little reason for a police officer to ignore information provided by police
administrators about a neighborhood.
175. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (recognizing the objective nature of
reasonable suspicion); Kinports, supra note 153, at 754–55.
176. Silverman, supra note 86, at 136 (“[E]ven the same citizen behavior can take on numerous
meanings to the public and to the police depending on the context of the behavior. The location, time
of event, number of events, aggregation of events, and condition of the victim/observer relative to the
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perfect information about general crime patterns in an area only
strengthens the level of objective suspicion. Police know that there are
177
regular patterns to a neighborhood. Using the official designation
about the area as a contextual factor only strengthens the officer’s
objective reasonableness for a stop.
B. Effect on a Court’s Reasonable Suspicion Analysis
An accurately designated high-crime area based on objective data
simplifies a court’s constitutional analysis. With an official high-crime
area designation, one factor of the totality of circumstances analysis for
178
determining reasonable suspicion is essentially predetermined. If an
officer reasonably relied on this fact, and the designation was officially
generated, then under Wardlow it would be reasonable for the court to
consider the fact as part of the totality of circumstances. The judge will
simply use this factor to make the ultimate legal conclusion whether the
officer had reasonable suspicion. While the fact that the stop occurred in
a high-crime area is by itself insufficient for a reasonable suspicion
determination, some courts have been willing to accept that otherwise
179
innocuous activities in these areas can justify a stop. A predetermined
high-crime area in many ways constrains the discretion of courts to
evaluate reasonable suspicion. Courts are required to consider a highcrime area, and such a designation effectively lowers the threshold of
180
reasonable suspicion in these officially designated areas.
In addition, because the predetermined area is designated by police
administrators at the district level and not by the police officer at the
181
street level, courts will be even more likely to defer to this judgment.
The administrative nature of the decision removes the determination

perpetrator and the previous activity/reputation of the perpetrator/actor often influence the extent to
which events are viewed as threatening and offensive . . . .” (citing George L. Kelling, “Broken
Windows” and Police Discretion 35 (1999))).
177. Benforado, supra note 85, at 857 (“Physical space offers cues to law enforcement officers that
suggest appropriate behavior . . . at the point of deciding who seems suspicious and needs to be
investigated further . . . .”).
178. Of course, such a fact can be contested at the hearing, and, as discussed in Part VI, infra, there
may be reason to question the validity of the designation.
179. See supra Part III.
180. David A. Harris, Particularized Suspicion, Categorical Judgments: Supreme Court Rhetoric
Versus Lower Court Reality Under Terry v. Ohio, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 975, 1022 (1998).
181. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (“[I]n certain limited
circumstances, the Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such
searches without any measure of individualized suspicion.”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec.’s Ass’n, 489 U.S.
602, 623 (1989) (recognizing the government’s interest in dispensing with the warrant requirement
when obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61 n.13 (1976); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311,
314–16 (1972).
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from the core concern of the Fourth Amendment, which is preventing
182
abuses of officers in their discretionary decisions. This deference would
likely be even stronger for legislatively designated high-crime areas due
183
to issues of comity and democratic theory.
C. Effect on Fourth Amendment Doctrine
By marking out a defined space of potentially less constitutional
184
protection, the use of GIS technologies exacerbates a tension in current
Fourth Amendment doctrine. As will be explained below, the ability to
create a recognized high-crime area opens up the possibility of also
creating an implicit high-crime area exception to the Fourth
Amendment. While such an exception would be in direct tension with
Supreme Court cases prohibiting “general crime suppression” tactics and
requiring more than mere presence in a high-crime area, it might, in the
day-to-day reality of police encounters on the street, become a de facto
reality.
1. Standard of Reasonable Suspicion
High-crime area designations do not change the legal standard for a
Terry stop. Individualized “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity” is
185
still the legal test. In the high-crime area context, reasonable suspicion
requires more than someone “look[ing] suspicious” or not belonging in
186
the area. Yet by predetermining a place of expected generalized
criminal activity, the high-crime area designation leads to a lower
187
standard of suspicion in practice.

182. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is . . . . in requiring that . . . inferences be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.” (footnote omitted)).
183. See Robert Justin Lipkin, Which Constitution? Who Decides? The Problem of Judicial
Supremacy and the Interbranch Solution, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1055, 1132 (2006); James B. Thayer, The
Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 144 (1893)
(discussing the judicial obligation in upholding legislative acts).
184. Constitutional protection may be lessened in that the threshold is lower because otherwise
innocuous acts, such as running from police or conducting hand-to-hand transactions, create
reasonable suspicion.
185. The court must find reasonable suspicion based on the totality of circumstances: “[T]he
essence of all that has been written is that the totality of circumstances—the whole picture—must be
taken into account. Based upon that whole picture, the detaining officers must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968) (“This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is
predicated is the central teaching of [the] Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.” (internal
citations omitted)); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (requiring more than
the mere assertion that the defendant “looked suspicious” in an area that had a “high incidence of
drug traffic” to find reasonable suspicion).
186. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49 (1979).
187. Whether this has always been the case is debatable, but what is evidenced in an official high-
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The clearest analogy to the situation can be seen in the application
of Fourth Amendment “reasonable suspicion” to roving U.S. Border
Patrol stops along the United States border. The same constitutional
standard applies in this context as in police stops, but, as has been made
clear along the border, the “thumbs are on the scale” of reasonable
188
suspicion in certain targeted areas. In Almeida-Sanchez v. United
189
190
States and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, the Supreme Court
allowed U.S. Border Patrol agents to stop suspected illegal immigrants
191
using a reasonable suspicion standard. The result is that border patrol
agents can stop individuals if they have reasonable suspicion to suspect
illegal status and can question those stopped about citizenship and
192
immigration status.
As written, the legal standard appears to provide protection against
arbitrary or abusive stops and seizures of individuals. Yet as applied
along the southern border of the United States, the reasonable suspicion
standard has proved less protective of civil liberties. Scholars have
193
criticized the way in which it has been abused, citizens have been
194
arbitrarily detained, and courts have commented on the ease with
which the term has been manipulated to justify a finding of reasonable
suspicion. As Judge Jacques Wiener of the Fifth Circuit observed, judges
have been willing to uphold vehicle stops along the border based on

crime area is that the term will have a greater effect. See, e.g., David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable
Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 660, 677–78 (1994);
Lewis R. Katz, Terry v. Ohio at Thirty-Five: A Revisionist View, 74 Miss. L.J. 423, 493 (2004);
Raymond, supra note 20, at 121–22; David Seawell, Wardlow’s Case: A Call to Broaden the Perspective
of American Criminal Law, 78 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1119, 1130–31 (2001); Walsh, supra note 16, at 914.
For example, handing an object to another person in one neighborhood justifies a seizure, whereas
handing an object to another person in a non high-crime area does not. Shelton v. United States,
929 A.2d 420, 423 (D.C. 2007).
188. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); see also Cameron W.
Eubanks, Laptops, Airports, and the Border: Expanding Technology and the Shrinking Fourth
Amendment in United States v. Arnold, 64 U. Miami L. Rev. 1117, 1129 (2010) (“[S]earches conducted
at the border are generally reasonable simply because they occur at the border.”); Anil Kalhan, The
Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 1137, 1157–58 (2008) (discussing the expansion of immigration enforcement activities into the
interior of the country).
189. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
190. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
191. See Renata Ann Gowie, Driving While Mexican: Why the Supreme Court Must Reexamine
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 23 Hous. J. Int’l L. 233, 236 (2001) (discussing Supreme Court
precedent allowing a roving border patrol to stop vehicles based on specific articulable facts and
rational inferences from those facts).
192. See id.
193. Id. at 237.
194. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 Wash.
U. L.Q. 675, 697 (2000) (citing James Pinkerton, Border Patrol Twice Stops U.S. Judge on Way to
Court, Hous. Chron., Oct. 1, 2000, at 1; Leonel Sanchez, Latinos Protest Ethnic Profiling, San Diego
Union-Trib., July 24, 2000, at A1).
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Among the findings, courts have

The vehicle was suspiciously dirty and muddy, or the vehicle was
suspiciously squeaky-clean; the driver was suspiciously dirty, shabbily
dressed and unkept, or the driver was too clean; the vehicle was
suspiciously traveling fast, or was traveling suspiciously slow (or even
was traveling suspiciously at precisely the legal speed limit); the [old
car, new car, big car, station wagon, camper, oilfield service truck,
SUV, van] is the kind of vehicle typically used for smuggling aliens or
drugs; the driver would not make eye contact with the agent, or the
driver made eye contact too readily; the driver appeared nervous (or
the driver even appeared too cool, calm, and collected); the time of day
[early morning, mid-morning, late afternoon, early evening, late
evening, middle of the night] is when “they” tend to smuggle
contraband or aliens; the vehicle was riding suspiciously low
(overloaded), or suspiciously high (equipped with heavy duty shocks
and springs); the passengers were slumped suspiciously in their seats,
presumably to avoid detection, or the passengers were sitting
suspiciously ramrod-erect; the vehicle suspiciously slowed when being
overtaken by the patrol car traveling at a high rate of speed with its
high-beam lights on, or the vehicle suspiciously maintained its same
speed and direction despite being overtaken by a patrol car traveling at
196
a high speed with its high beam lights on; and on and on ad nauseam.

These are not atypical findings. Nor can they be explained simply as
the result of the particular facts of the cases. Instead, the result stems
from the ease with which reasonable suspicion evaluations can be swayed
by the place in which the event occurs. The reality is that on the U.S.Mexico border, reasonable suspicion means something different than in
other parts of the country.
Does the roving border-patrol analogy mean that there is an
exception to the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion standards for
those individuals travelling near the border? No. But the “thumbs on the
scale” are real and must be considered in evaluating how a predesignated high-crime area will affect the Fourth Amendment in
practice. As has been seen in the ad hoc approach in federal court
decisions on the subject, a high-crime area designation can have a
considerable weight.
2. Tension with “General Crime Suppression” Techniques
At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that
“general crime suppression techniques” cannot be used to circumvent the
197
protections of the Fourth Amendment. In a series of cases involving
195. United States. v. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d 281, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2000) (Wiener, J. dissenting).
This is similar to Justice Marshall’s dissent in United States v. Sokolow, which analyzed drug-courier
profiles. See 490 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. Zapata-Ibarra, 223 F.3d at 282–83 (alteration in original).
197. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (holding that a state hospital’s
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checkpoints, the Supreme Court has disallowed “general crime
198
suppression” tactics, even in high-crime areas. These cases allow us to
explore a counterweight in the doctrine to see how the Court might
address seizures in a predesignated high-crime area.
The legal framework for checkpoints differs from the analysis for
reasonable suspicion. In checkpoint cases, the issue is whether the
199
seizure is reasonable based on a balancing of interests. The question is
not whether the police officers have individualized reasonable suspicion,
but whether the seizure itself is justified based on the type of checkpoint
or the place of the roadblock. Despite the different legal framework, the
Court’s approach to checkpoints offers some insight into how it might
address an empirically validated, localized, and targeted crime problem.
In each of the checkpoint cases, the Court has balanced the public
interest necessitating the seizure against the liberty interests of the
200
individuals seized. In Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, the
Court held that sobriety checkpoints were constitutional because the
public interest in preventing drunk driving outweighed the brief stops at
201
issue. Relevant to our data-driven focus, the Sitz Court had been
presented with empirical data showing the effectiveness of these sobriety
202
checkpoint practices. The Court used this data to distinguish the
203
unconstitutional checkpoints in Delaware v. Prouse, in which no data
204
had been presented. While the Sitz data showed only a 1.6% success
205
rate in identifying drunk drivers, the Court held that on balance, the
specific goal of preventing drunk driving was weighty enough, citing the
“magnitude of the drunken driving problem” and statistical basis for that

administration of a urine test without the patient’s consent was an unreasonable search); Indianapolis
v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (holding that Indianapolis’ drug interdiction checkpoints were an
unreasonable search); Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding that Georgia’s drug-testing
requirement for state electoral candidates was an unreasonable search).
198. E.g., Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
199. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1979). The Supreme Court has analyzed seizures by
balancing the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure against the degree to which the
seizure advances the public interest.
200. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
201. Id. at 451. Drunk driving and the tracking of drunk-driving incidents has also been the focus
of crime-mapping efforts. See Tom Beretich, Mapping Programs Target Alcohol Impaired Driving,
Geography & Pub. Safety, July 2008, at 5, 5; Jeff Kaufmann, Creating a Safer Houston Through Crash
Mapping, Geography & Pub. Safety, July 2008, at 2, 3; Ned Levine, On Traffic Safety and Law
Enforcement, Geography & Pub. Safety, July 2008, at 1, 1.
202. 496 U.S. at 451.
203. 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (holding that random stops violate the Fourth Amendment because such
stops provide officers with “unbridled discretion”).
204. Leslie P. Butler, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond: An Unprecedented Use of “Primary”
Purpose Leaves Wide Open the Door for “Secondary” Problems, 46 St. Louis U. L.J. 175, 189, 194
(2002).
205. 496 U.S. at 454–55. The sobriety checkpoint at issue only lasted for seventy-five minutes. Only
126 vehicles passed through the checkpoint, two were stopped and one was arrested.
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206

concern. The Court seemed comfortable allowing a particularized
seizure for a particular purpose in a particular place (even if not targeting
a particular individual).
The question then arises, if empirical analysis from an official highcrime area demonstrated that sobriety-checkpoint-like stops in an area
were effective or that the crime problem in an area was so severe as to
outweigh the intrusion of brief investigative stops, does the logic of Sitz
allow brief seizures to address a targeted high-crime problem? This is not
a hypothetical situation, as certain jurisdictions have made exactly that
argument.
207
In Mills v. District of Columbia, police checkpoints were erected in
a targeted high-crime area that had experienced a series of violent crimes
and shootings in a short period of time. Police sought to identify the
names and purposes of individuals entering this area in an effort to
208
prevent future crimes. A federal district court upheld the checkpoints
but the D.C. Circuit declared them unconstitutional.
The D.C. Circuit based its decision on City of Indianapolis v.
209
Edmond. In Edmond, the Supreme Court held that checkpoints
established for the primary purpose of general crime suppression were an
unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment. The checkpoints in
Edmond were understood to be drug interdiction roadblocks, created to
210
“[interrupt] the flow of illegal narcotics throughout Indianapolis.”
Even though those roadblocks were more effective than those in Sitz,
with a five-percent hit rate for drugs recovered and a nine-percent hit
rate for arrests stemming from the roadblocks, the court still found them
211
unconstitutional. The court required a “quantum of individualized
212
suspicion” beyond the general concern for drugs. In other words, the
public interest in stemming the flow of illegal drugs in an area known for
illegal drugs could not outweigh the liberty interests of those stopped
without suspicion.

206. Id. at 451.
207. 571 F.3d 1304, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“The neighborhood safety zone (NSZ) program was
created by the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) in response to the violence that has plagued
the Trinidad neighborhood in Northeast Washington, D.C., for many years. Before this case arose,
Trinidad had recently been the scene of twenty-five assaults involving firearms, five of which resulted
in deaths, and six of which involved the use of vehicles. Shortly after a triple homicide in the Trinidad
neighborhood on May 31, 2008, the MPD designated a portion of the neighborhood an NSZ.”).
208. Id. at 1307 (“[O]fficers were required to identify themselves to motorists and inquire whether
the motorists had ‘legitimate reasons’ for entering the NSZ area.”).
209. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
210. Butler, supra note 204, at 175 (quoting the Indianapolis Police Department’s written
guidelines for drug interdiction checkpoints, which were also cited in Edmond v. Goldsmith, 38 F.
Supp. 2d 1016, 1018 (S.D. Ind. 1998)).
211. Id. (1161 cars stopped, 55 drug related arrests, 49 other arrests).
212. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
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Clearly, the same logic could be used to push back against the
creation of a high-crime area exception to the Fourth Amendment.
213
Edmond and other cases have drawn the line at generalized approaches
to crime. Even in response to targeted and empirically validated crime
problems, courts have deemed unreasonable those overbroad responses
214
that do not include an individualized basis for suspicion.
The question remains, however, what if instead of establishing a
checkpoint in a targeted high-crime area, the police simply flooded the
neighborhood with officers and had these officers ask for identification
or ask residents to state their purpose for walking through the area.
Assuming seizures could be made only on reasonable suspicion, these
high-crime area roving patrols might well be upheld. Even though the
officers would be doing generalized crime-suppression work in checking
the residents (and arguably in a manner more arbitrary than a
checkpoint), they would not be violating the Fourth Amendment
because they would be able to point to some other activity to justify a
seizure (due to the heightened suspicion created by the high-crime area
designation). This practice, legitimated by empirical data, would create a
de facto high-crime area exception in certain high-crime areas. In such a
targeted high-crime area, deference to police suspicion might begin
looking like the roving border patrol example discussed earlier. Again,
this is not a hypothetical as such tactics are being deployed today in New
York City in conjunction with its CompStat program. As will be
discussed in the next Subpart, these tactics have a direct effect on the
liberty interests and civil rights of residents of the area.
D. Effect on Liberty of Citizens: Why It Matters
For citizens living in designated high-crime areas, the Supreme
Court’s checkpoint jurisprudence may not offer much comfort. The
reasonable suspicion analysis is elastic enough for certain police
departments to announce targeted “stop and frisk” tactics, whereby
officers are encouraged to make contact with citizens in the hopes of
215
creating justification for a full seizure or frisk. The legal standard is the

213. See cases cited supra note 197.
214. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45–56 (“[P]rogrammatic purposes may be relevant to the validity of the
Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized
suspicion.”). This has been a consistent theme in the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Some
form of particularized suspicion is required to justify a stop. Edmond, thus, offers some comfort to
those concerned that high-crime areas might be treated like sobriety concerns on the nation’s
highways.
215. David Hinson, Note, Pressure Points: How a Combination of Methods Employed to Reduce
Urban Firearm Crime Threatens the 4th Amendment and Proposed Solutions, 43 New Eng. L. Rev.
869, 883 (2009) (“In 1988, Boston police, faced with a rising ‘gang problem,’ assigned the City Wide
Anti-Crime Unit to Boston’s most violent neighborhoods. . . . In 1989, a Boston precinct commander
publicly referred to the tactics as a ‘stop and frisk campaign,’ . . . further strengthening the public’s
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same, but in practice, citizens in targeted high-crime areas have less
robust Fourth Amendment protections.
A vivid example of such a tactic took place in Brownsville,
Brooklyn, an eight-square-block high-crime area. From 2006 to 2010,
police officers conducted 52,000 stop and frisks among a population of
216
14,000. That means one stop per year for each of the residents in the
217
area. One man, a twenty-six-year-old legal assistant, had been stopped
218
over thirty times. Out of those stops, only about one percent of the
219
suspects were arrested. However, Brownsville is statistically a highercrime area—one that deservedly has drawn the attention of police
220
administrators.
How did the designation of the neighborhood as a high-crime area
affect the liberty interests of its citizens? First, it has to be acknowledged
that from a traditional Fourth Amendment perspective, there is no
221
protection from heightened police presence in public. Additional police
on the street, additional surveillance techniques, and even additional
consensual police contacts do not infringe upon a reasonable expectation
of privacy, because what one knowingly exposes to the public, including
222
one’s presence, is not protected. While the Court did acknowledge in
Katz v. United States that the Fourth Amendment may protect
information that we “seek[] to preserve as private, even in an area
223
accessible to the public,” most denizens of higher crime areas cannot
224
take measures to signal such an expectation of privacy.

distrust of the Boston Police Department.”); Andrew Maykuth, Philly Cops Ready to Up Stop-andFrisk Tactics, Phil. Inquirer, Apr. 14, 2008, http://www.policeone.com/patrol-issues/articles/1683965Philly-cops-ready-to-up-stop-and-frisk-tactics (“Police Commissioner Charles H. Ramsey wants
officers to increase the number of legal searches they conduct as part of a strategy the department calls
aggressive but intelligent policing. ‘We’re not asking you to do anything illegal or unconstitutional in
any way,’ Lt. Francis T. Healy, a department lawyer, says in a training video being shown to patrol
officers. ‘We just want you to do what you’re doing today, but step it up a bit.’” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
216. Ray Rivera et al., supra note 98 (“[B]etween January 2006 and March 2010, the police made
nearly 52,000 stops on these blocks and in these buildings.”).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967).
222. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitution of Public Space: Fitting the
Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks Image and Identity, 82 Texas L. Rev. 1349, 1357 (2004);
Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 496 (2006) (“When surveillance
occurs in a public place, however, the Court has refused to recognize a reasonable expectation of
privacy.”); see, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 557–60 (1980); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973); Katz, 389 U.S. at
352.
223. 389 U.S. at 351.
224. Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 391,
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Yet, while there may not be a Fourth Amendment violation,
broader Fourth Amendment values affecting the expectation of privacy
need to be evaluated in considering the effect of predesignating high225
An intensive and visible police presence affects
crime areas.
226
behavior. Police walking on the street, inquiring about the reason for
being in a certain area, or monitoring the travel of residents will regulate
227
Some of this is explicit, such as when
freedom of movement.
228
individuals are ordered not to congregate together. In Washington,
D.C.’s “drug free zones,” more than two people may not walk or talk
229
together after being ordered to disperse. Such associational rights may
230
Citizens may be
be significantly impacted in high-crime areas.
concerned about retaining informational privacy, revealing intimate
231
facts, or a loss of autonomy, even in a public space. Police regulation
and self-regulation can have an effect on individual expression, creativity,
232
and freedom to travel.
An increased police presence also means an increased likelihood of
233
interpersonal police-citizen encounters. For example, a high percentage
of the stop and frisks in New York City turned out to be mistaken

401 (2003) (“[T]he Court has signaled that the reasonableness of privacy expectations in such areas is
contingent upon the existence of ‘effective’ barriers to intrusion. In other words, one’s constitutional
privacy is limited by one’s actual privacy. That stance ineluctably leads to the conclusion that Fourth
Amendment protection varies depending on the extent to which one can afford accoutrements of
wealth such as a freestanding home, fences, lawns, heavy curtains, and vision and sound proof doors
and walls.” (footnote omitted)).
225. Ronald J. Bacigal, The Right of the People to Be Secure, 82 Ky. L.J. 145, 186 (1993) (“Because
the Fourth Amendment exists to limit and regulate the exercise of governmental power, its coverage
properly extends to any unilateral governmental action that infringes upon a citizen’s protected right
of privacy.” (footnote omitted)); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 197, 209–12 (1993); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment:
Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1777 (1994)
(discussing the constitutional value of “trust” underlying the Fourth Amendment); see Thomas Y.
Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 547, 624–723 (1999) (offering a
comprehensive history of the Fourth Amendment); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth
Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 925, 925–73 (1997) (same).
226. See Blitz, supra note 222, at 1407.
227. Solove, supra note 222, at 492–94 (discussing surveillance as one aspect of the taxonomy of
privacy).
228. D.C. Code §§ 48-1002–48-1003 (2011); see also Kathleen Beckett & Steve Herbert, Penal
Boundaries: Banishment and the Expansion of Punishment, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 1, 9 (2010)
(discussing the exclusion of convicted persons from “drug-free zones” and “prostitution-free zones”).
229. D.C. Code §§ 48-1002–48-1003.
230. Blitz, supra note 222, at 1410.
231. Id. at 1408-09.
232. Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the
Streets, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1262 (1990) (discussing the right to travel as a liberty interest).
233. Ronald Weitzer, Racialized Policing: Residents’ Perceptions in Three Neighborhoods, 34 L. &
Soc’y Rev. 129, 130 (2000) (“Because crime rates tend to be higher in both black and white lower-class
communities than in middle-class areas, residents of lower-class areas have more contacts with police
and, hence, a greater number of contacts that might go awry and result in conflict.”).
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(meaning no contraband was recovered), resulting in an unnecessary
234
infringement on personal liberty. Scholars have recognized that these
largely negative police-citizen encounters may affect dignity rights of
235
236
citizens, may involve a stigmatic harm, and may be interpreted as a
237
lack of respect that can itself undermine core constitutional principles.
238
This restructuring of power undercuts the “right to be let alone” that
informs our Fourth Amendment protections. Whether they embrace it as
a positive protective presence or reject it as an unnecessary interference,
residents in these areas are forced to think about police surveillance as
an ever-present reality.
Finally, citizens may perceive inequality in the application of the law
based on class or race. The correlation between high-crime areas and low
239
income communities is strong. The correlation between low-income
240
communities and communities of color is similarly strong.
Neighborhoods may become a proxy for racially biased law
241
enforcement. Residents in those neighborhoods may believe that
242
different rules apply because of race. This perceived discriminatory

234. Bacigal, supra note 225, at 194 (“By refusing to place constitutional restrictions on an officer’s
initial approach to a citizen, the Court has decreed that police officers need not justify their desire to
single out and confront a particular individual. The hapless, though presumptively innocent, individual
must suffer this form of police scrutiny as part of the cost of walking on a public street.”).
235. John D. Castiglione, Human Dignity Under the Fourth Amendment, 2008 Wis. L. Rev. 655,
660–61.
236. Kristin Connor, Updating Brignoni-Ponce: A Critical Analysis of Race-Based Immigration
Enforcement, 11 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 567, 607–10 (2008); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s
Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1016, 1066 (1995).
237. Andrew E. Taslitz, Respect and the Fourth Amendment, 94 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 15, 23
(2003) (“What is lost in the mere technicality vision of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, is an
appreciation for the ways that it affects the fate of communities of identity. The Fourth Amendment
protects core interests essential to human flourishing, interests in privacy, property, and freedom of
movement.” (footnotes omitted)).
238. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
239. Benforado, supra note 85, at 846–48 (“[K]ey factors correlated to high rates of crime—like the
level of male unemployment and the prevalence of single-adult households—are not constant across
neighborhoods; in fact, quite the opposite. Poverty itself is embedded spatially, which has powerful
implications given its well-documented connection to crime.”); Raymond, supra note 20, at 128;
Slobogin, supra note 224, at 404.
240. Harris, supra note 187, at 660; Stuntz, supra note 170, at 1810 (“An early 1990s study of census
data found that the population of extremely poor neighborhoods in America’s hundred largest cities
was 57% black, 24% Hispanic, and 16% white.”).
241. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 233–36
(1983); Weitzer, supra note 233, at 141 (“Police may discriminate not only against individuals but also
against neighborhoods populated by different racial groups.”).
242. David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters,
84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 290–91 (1999); Johnson, supra note 241, at 236; Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race,
Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 327, 347 (1994); see also Taslitz,
supra note 237, at 21–22; Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth
Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 956, 965 (1999).
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treatment both undermines the belief that the legal system is fair, and
243
disrupts other social organizing structures in a community.
E. Language and Line-Drawing Concerns
To summarize, the use of crime-mapping technologies to create
official high-crime areas significantly impacts Fourth Amendment
freedoms. Whether viewed positively or negatively from a policy
perspective, the term “high-crime area” does have real, and perhaps
unintended, constitutional consequences. If police administrators create
official high-crime areas using the Supreme Court’s suggested
terminology, then reviewing courts will simply defer to that designation
in their analysis. The result will be the creation of an implicit high-crime
area exception to the Fourth Amendment based on crime-mapping data.
The problem is initially one of language. Even on its face, the “highcrime area” term is overgeneralized. Usually, an officer is suspicious not
of crime in general, but rather a particular type of crime. Reasonable
suspicion develops because the officer is observing some ongoing activity
244
that relates to an identifiable criminal act. GIS technology itself
demonstrates that the generalized “high-crime area” terminology is
outdated. Police in jurisdictions that use GIS know far more about the
level, rate, and location of particular crimes than the generic label
245
suggests. In collecting and coding the crime reports, the information is
not simply recorded as undifferentiated crime, but as particular types of
crimes in particular locations. Jurisdictions identify the location of highdrug areas, high-murder areas, and high auto-theft areas as separate and
distinct places. A generic high-crime area label is thus an unnecessarily
sloppy term, but one that can be improved by GIS technology.
Similarly, the terminology is vague about how “high” in crime an
area must be to be constitutionally significant. Courts’ struggle to define
the term results in large measure from the difficulty in comparing one
area to another. There is a denominator problem—meaning it is
246
impossible to judge a relative comparison without a set denominator.

243. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Reciprocal Effects of Crime and Incarceration in New York City
Neighborhoods, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1551, 1566 (2003) (“Neighborhood is important in the social
regulation of both legal and illegal behavior; also because of this, it is the locus at which criminogenic
factors exert their influence on the everyday lives of neighborhood residents.”).
244. What an officer observes in a hand-to-hand drug deal is different than what an officer
observes when watching a person case a store for a robbery attempt. To know that the observed handto-hand transaction is happening in a generic high-crime area is less useful than knowing that the area
is a high-drug area. A hand-to-hand transaction even in the highest auto theft and robbery areas
means little in terms of any relevance to reasonable suspicion for a stop.
245. Matthew White & Todd Wiles, Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office: Mapping with Text Analysis,
8 Crime Mapping News, no. 1, 2009 at 1, 1.
246. Harries, supra note 7, at 105 (“[W]hat is the crime rate? To answer this we have to know the
base of the rate. Do we want it per 1,000 persons, per reporting area, or per patrol district? To
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Should the crime rate be calculated by population,
block,
or
249
250
district? Does it depend on the type of crime? Does it depend where
you are in the country? Even with almost perfect information about
crime patterns and with sophisticated data-analysis programs, these linedrawing questions have no easy answers.
To solve the twin problems of language and line drawing, it is
necessary to change our terminology and our focus. Courts should
recognize that the existing “high-crime area” terminology is too
generalized to be useful and is not consistent with the specific GIS data
available to police administrators. A more particularized approach that
focuses on the specific crimes in specific areas is both more consistent
with the current use of crime-mapping technology as well as more
responsive to Fourth Amendment tensions.

V. A New Framework: Redrawing High-Crime Areas
With advancements in GIS technology, data-collection mechanisms
now allow for a more particularized understanding of crime patterns in
Fourth Amendment suppression hearings. Courts no longer need to rely
on overbroad terminology or generalized neighborhood labeling.
251
Programs such as CompStat and other daily and weekly reporting
mechanisms mean that officers can be provided with up-to-date data on
252
particular locations. Hotspot technology can identify specific locations
calculate this rate we must know how many crime incidents have occurred, and, if we are calculating a
population-based rate, how many persons there are per unit area. This value, the base of our rate, is
also known as the denominator, because it is the bottom of the fraction used to calculate the rate.”).
247. Eck, supra note 109, at 32 (“Analysts often use population counts as denominators for
calculating rates for these other crime types. This approach, however, may merely create hot spot
mapping output that misleads by exaggerating the crime problem in town centers that have few
residents but a concentration of crimes such as robbery and vehicle crime. Ideally, it is preferable to
use denominators that are directly relevant to the crime type for which the analysts wish to create a
rate. In the case of residential burglary, analysts usually have this with census tract household
counts.”).
248. “Wide interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional variations in environments also make the
application of absolute definition criteria tricky.” Harries, supra note 7, at 113.
249. The difficulty is that without understanding the base line population, it is hard to compare the
significance of the amount of crime. Derek Paulsen explains:
For example, if two different areas within a city both have clusters of 10 crimes but one has
a population three times higher than the other, the magnitude of the crime concentrations is
very different. Specifically, the less populous area would have a much higher magnitude
crime problem despite both areas experiencing the same absolute amount of crimes.
Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 183.
250. Eck, supra note 109, at 32 (“For robbery, a suitable denominator for calculating rates would
be pedestrian counts for the area; for vehicle crime, a suitable denominator would be vehicle counts.”).
251. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 270.
252. Willis et al., supra note 10, at 172 (“Members of each department’s Crime Analysis Unit
(CAU) selected the data on those crimes regularly presented at COMPSTAT meetings and entered
them into a database using a data management program. These data were generally available the
following day.”).
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253

by crime and even time of day. In some jurisdictions, new crime maps
are generated every twenty-four hours and can be shared with officers
254
and staff and even emailed to officers on the beat. With modern
technology, daily reporting has improved to almost real-time data
255
256
collection. Police officers can be deployed to respond to reports of
257
crimes within minutes. Personal crime maps can be created for
258
individual beats. With centralized databases available on mobile police
computers, information about areas, persons, and even mug shots can be
259
uploaded and provided to officers on their beats. Adding global
positioning system (GPS) data and locating information to the systems
260
provides even more real-time data capture capabilities. Similarly, the
261
262
geographic location and time can be narrowly defined.
253. Id.
254. Tom Casady, Automating Briefings for Police Officers, in Crime Mapping Case Studies:
Practice and Research 27, 28 (Spencer Chainey & Lisa Tompson eds., 2008). For example, Lincoln,
Nebraska, home to a police force of 317 officers, 105 civilian employees, 242,000 citizens, has a process
whereby when a certain level of crime in a given area reaches a stated threshold, there is an automatic
report generated and emailed to the officers. The email includes a map and details of the incidents. Id.;
see also Tom Casady, Case Study: Crime Mapping in Lincoln, Nebraska, in Chainey & Ratcliffe,
supra note 24, at 8–9; Rich, supra note 50, at 3 (“[T]hrough [the Cambridge, Massachusetts police
department’s Daily Crime Bulletin] the department shares maps and crime analysis so that all officers
and staff are more aware and knowledgeable of crime trends in various neighborhoods.”); Willis et al.,
supra note 10, at 172 (observing that in Minneapolis the COMPSTAT analysts would map the new
crimes within twenty-four hours of entering a police report).
255. Douglass, supra note 10, at 6 (“With the advancement of computer aided dispatch (CAD) and
record management systems (RMS) however, officers began to perform sophisticated strategic and
tactical crime analysis. This kind of analysis provides real-time information, which allows law
enforcement to virtually locate crimes as they occur and respond with the resources necessary to make
a difference.”).
256. In Overland Park, Kansas, this real-time policing is happening.
At Overland Park, plans include the creation of a desktop application that would allow a
patrol sergeant to view the hot spots identified by our crime analysis unit and use the
application’s “drag-and-drop” function to deploy patrol units to these areas. These
deployments could change from place to place and hour to hour based on the volume of
criminal activity. As a result, a patrol officer could be assigned to any number of
deployments throughout his or her shift.
Id. at 7; see also Allison Mayer, Geospatial Technology Helps East Orange Crack Down on Crime,
Geography & Pub. Safety, Jan. 2009, at 8, 8–9 (describing the success of crime-mapping technologies
that reduced crime levels by half during 2003–2008).
257. ARCWatch, supra note 97, at 2 (“Crime analysts produce continuously updated crime maps
that are distributed via e-mail throughout Columbia PD including to law enforcement commanders,
investigators, and police officers working on patrol. With just a few mouse clicks and within minutes,
crime intelligence sergeants send out information about suspects in the form of prepared Be-On-theLookout (BOLO) reports, which are crime notifications that go to police staff after an incident, or
series of related incidents, occurs.”).
258. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 157.
259. In San Diego County, there is a new program that will share information including detailed
local crime data and mug shots of probationers and parolees among seventy-one agencies. Wartell,
supra note 50, at 4.
260. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 171 (“A pilot program between the Kentucky State
Troopers and Eastern Kentucky University in 2002 tested the usefulness of GPS and GIS. All troopers
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Faced with these technological changes, courts should embrace this
innovation as a way to provide analytical rigor to the high-crime area
question. Courts need not limit themselves to generalized understandings
of undifferentiated crimes or to overbroad official labels. Problem areas
of a particular crime can be identified, targeted, and reported in court as
part of any Fourth Amendment suppression hearing. This crime-mapping
data can inform a new particularized approach to replace the current
high-crime area analysis.
A. The Particularized Approach
A particularized approach to high-crime areas is centered on the
collection and distribution of particularized crime data, including crime
type, time, and location. By necessity, the approach assumes that the
technology exists in the jurisdiction, the police officer is aware of this
data, and the information affects the officer’s observations.
The particularized approach focuses on the nexus between a
particularized crime pattern in a defined area and a police officer’s
observations on the street. In a Fourth Amendment suppression hearing,
if a police officer relied on current data about a particular type of crime

in one post were provided with GPS receivers and were instructed to radio basic crime and location
information to their post after taking a crime report. These crime data were then used to create daily,
weekly, and monthly tactical crime maps. Preliminary results have shown that crime data that used to
take as long as 15 days to process and map are accurately being created and disseminated within a 24hour period.”).
261. Usually the area will be defined by blocks, because the crimes are coded by block. In
discussing the crime rates of Baltimore County, Maryland, one researcher articulated the decision to
use blocks as the measure of comparison:
Crime densities per block were calculated by dividing the count for each block by the
area of the block. The density metric was selected as the best measure of the spatial
distribution of crime, particularly when calculated for small areas such as the census blocks
used here. Density within larger units, such as census tracts, would be less meaningful owing
to the possibility of substantial intra-unit variation. Blocks tend to be smaller in areas with
high population density where the probability of crimes is also theoretically highest, thus
reinforcing the suitability of crime density by blocks as the most appropriate metric for the
present purpose.
Other possible metrics were rejected. These were crime frequencies and populationbased rates. Frequencies are unsuitable as they incorporate no information about the size of
the geographic unit. Rates would be more appropriate in that they provide an adjustment
for population, but none for the size of geographic unit. However, rates are inappropriate
for small areas such as blocks owing to the possibility of zero or near-zero values in the
denominator, producing rates that approach infinity.
Keith Harries, Extreme Spatial Variations in Crime Density in Baltimore County, MD, 37 Geoforum
404, 406 (2006).
262. “For drug markets in Jersey City, New Jersey, hot spots were defined by intersections and the
four connected street blocks, and hot times were from noon to midnight.” Anselin et al., supra note 7,
at 224 (citing Weisburd & Green, Defining the Street Level Drug Market, in Drugs and Crime:
Evaluating Public Policy Initiatives (MacKenzie & Uchida eds., 1994)).
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at a specific location, it would be appropriate to factor it in the
reasonable suspicion analysis. A court would look at the objective data
available to the officer and its relevance to the observation of alleged
criminal activity, and factor that objective information into the
reasonable suspicion analysis. If the officer did not base his decision on
specific data about a specific crime problem in a specific area, or if the
data relied upon did not demonstrate a specific and relevant crime
problem, then reliance on this information should not be considered.
Such a particularized approach to high-crime areas means modifying
our terminology. A court should not accept testimony or evidence that a
particular location was a generic high-crime area when more particularized
264
and specific information about the location is available. Nor should
claims based on officially designated, overbroad designations be allowed.
The test should be whether the officer acted on a particularized
265
understanding of the specific crime patterns of a particular area. This
will avoid relying on the “talismanic litany” of a high-crime area as a
cover for impermissible hunches or generalized suspicion about a
266
neighborhood.
In practical terms, instead of asking the question, “was the area at
issue objectively a high-crime area,” the court would ask whether a
reasonable officer with the same crime data could reasonably believe the
267
area was known for a particular type of crime. The data would have to
be up-to-date, localized to a few blocks or less, and specific to a
particular type of crime. A court would have to verify the data and that

263. The geographic limits should be similar to the limits of a hotspot, usually being no larger than
a block, or several blocks. See supra Part II.B.3.
264. Thus, for example, instead of referring to a generic high-crime area, the officer would refer to
the report that there were six recent robberies in the five blocks he was patrolling over the past three
weeks, or a usual uptick of six car thefts from a particular downtown development in the last week.
265. As a real world example, in Columbia, South Carolina, the adoption of GIS allowed the
police department to concentrate on a series of automobile thefts. Data had been compiled that
showed a rise in car thefts in a particular part of downtown Columbia that had been undergoing
economic development. ARCWatch, supra note 97, at 2. A targeted unit was sent to the area within
days. Id. The unit focused on the days and times that had been identified through the data. Officers
made several arrests based on this targeted approach. Id. Assuming that any of these arrests generated
a Fourth Amendment issue, the officers would well be position to argue that they had particularized
information about a particular crime pattern. Their targeted approach would justify relying on this
information about the area to justify any reasonable suspicion.
266. As an example, instead of a police officer testifying that an area was a high-crime area or even
a high-drug area, the officer would testify that there had been seven drug arrests in a two-block area in
the last month. The officer would then relay why what he saw on the street made that information
relevant. Assuming the police officer saw a hand-to-hand transaction of money for small objects, this
data would be factored into the court’s reasonable suspicion analysis.
267. This approach is somewhat similar to Judge McKee’s dissent in United States v. Bonner, with
the modification that the officer’s belief be based on statistical data and not just a generic reasonable
belief. 363 F.3d 213, 222 n.5 (3d Cir. 2004) (McKee, J., dissenting).
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the police officer knew of the data, but if verified and relevant, such
268
reliance would likely be reasonable.
Of course, some areas will have a number of different crimes
occurring in the same location. This does not obviate the need for a
particularized understanding. A location with several different types of
crime provides the police more flexibility to apply their particularized
understandings to the observations at issue. If the officer is aware of
current data that shows a block is known for drug dealing, prostitution,
and robbery, then observations consistent with any one of those activities
might give rise to reasonable suspicion. The point is to let the technology
and data, as opposed to a generalized sense about an area, guide the
269
officer.
B. Why the Particularized Approach Is Necessary
This particularized approach to crime areas has six distinct
advantages. First, it embraces current technology. While police
administrators and courts have moved along two divergent paths in terms
of using the technology, there is no good reason to continue this divide.
Sophisticated crime-mapping technologies are being used by crime270
mapping professionals on a daily basis. Particularized information
needs only to be provided to courts. On occasion, experts may be called
to resolve a dispute in the data, but such adversarial testing would
271
neither be time consuming nor complicated.
Second, a particularized approach avoids the denominator problem.
Courts no longer have to ask if this particular area is “higher” in crime in
a general sense than another area. Instead, courts would look at
particular data and how that data affected the officer. Of course,
questions about whether courts should evaluate absolute numbers or
comparisons will remain, as will questions about the proper geographical
area to compare. However, a shift to more particularized information
maintains an objective, data-driven focus on the crime realities of an
area. Police officers will be required to know the crime information

268. The important analytical shift is that the focus is why the officer would have believed the
specific actions in that specific neighborhood were suspicious. After all, the reason why this
information is relevant at all is that it affects the officer’s suspicions of an observed action in the
context of the area.
269. United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring) (“Just as a man with a hammer sees every problem as a nail, so a man with a badge may
see every corner of his beat as a high crime area.”); see also C.E.L. v. State, 995 So. 2d 558, 564 (Fla.
Dist. App. 2008) (Northcutt, J., dissenting) (“This neighborhood is classified as a ‘high-crime
neighborhood’ not by some objective statistical measurement, but by the subjective testimony of
individual law enforcement officers.”).
270. Filbert, supra note 48, at 4–5.
271. This is not to minimize the difficulties. In many cases the line between levels of crime will be
close.
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about an area and courts will need to demand objective verification, but
the focus will be on the particular data guiding the officer in a particular
setting.
Third, an emphasis on particularized information is consistent with
the admonition from the Supreme Court in Terry to demand
individualized and particularized suspicion for a Fourth Amendment
272
stop. Of course, even in an area of particularized crime, there still must
be individualized suspicion of the person, but requiring an additional
demand of particularized knowledge of the location reinforces this
273
constitutional limiting principle against general police power.
Fourth, a particularized understanding of crime patterns limits the
“thumbs on the scales” concern from the “roving border patrol” analogy.
Now, instead of starting from a place of generic criminal suspicion and
bootstrapping arguably innocent actions into individualized suspicion,
courts will focus on specific crime concerns linked to specific
observations in a particular area. The thumbs are not necessarily off the
scale, but the focus shifts from an area’s past reputation to current and
empirically based crime patterns in an area.
Fifth, a particularized approach minimizes the negative effects of
officially labeling an entire neighborhood. The focus is instead on the
particular type of crime at a precisely defined location. This both respects
the liberty of individuals living in high-crime neighborhoods and
minimizes the reputational damage done by an overbroad generalization.
Sixth, the approach provides the flexibility to target crime in non
higher-crime areas. One of the problems with the overreliance on the
generalized high-crime area terminology is that it disadvantages officers
in otherwise crime-free areas. For example, if there is suddenly a rash of
robberies, the fact that the area is not a high-crime area would cut
274
against the police in justifying reasonable suspicion. However, if the
officer could point to the data of a spike in robberies, the officer would
have extra reason to be suspicious of certain activities in that area.

272. This particularized approach is consistent with Justice Stevens’ dissent in Wardlow, in which
he stated, “Of course, it would be a different case if the officers had credible information respecting
that specific street address which reasonably led them to believe that criminal activity was afoot in that
narrowly defined area.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 138 n.16 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1138 (“We must be particularly careful to ensure that a ‘high
crime’ area factor is not used with respect to entire neighborhoods or communities in which members
of minority groups regularly go about their daily business, but is limited to specific, circumscribed
locations where particular crimes occur with unusual regularity.”).
273. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 670 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The general warrant, for example, was
certainly an effective means of law enforcement. Yet it was one of the primary aims of the Fourth
Amendment to protect citizens from the tyranny of being singled out for search and seizure without
particularized suspicion notwithstanding the effectiveness of this method.”).
274. Shelton v. United States, 929 A.2d 420, 423 (D.C. 2007).
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While not perfect, a more data-driven approach is an improvement
275
over the police “war stories” that have essentially served as the basis of
prior designations of high-crime areas. In fact, analysis of crime data has
shown that subjective opinions about high-crime areas are often
276
erroneous. Studies show that police officers perceive a greater crime
problem in their area than may actually exist from a comparative
277
perspective and officers also misperceive the relative dangerousness of
278
their patrol areas. A data-driven approach may even counteract some
279
of the underlying causes of the misperceptions about an area.
Thus, at least as a basis for moving the discussion forward, courts
should accept that when crime data is available, it should form the basis
of the Fourth Amendment determination.

VI. Potential Concerns
A particularized approach based on GIS technology raises serious
concerns of law and policy. First, there are concerns with the accuracy,
transparency, and reliability of crime-mapping data and analysis. Second,
there are concerns with application of this approach to police-citizen
encounters in these areas. These concerns center on the perceived
discriminatory effect of police policies that appear to target communities

275. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
276. See Rich, supra note 63, at 8.
277. In Nina Cope’s analysis of police understanding in Britain, she recognized that a tension can
result when the police officer’s subjective understanding of crime does not match with the objective
numbers:
[T]his macro picture of crime may not correspond to officers’ micro experiences of crime in
their area. For example, in one borough officers suggested there was a significant robbery
problem near a large transport interchange. The analyst, based on reviews of crime data and
crime mapping, suggested that while the station locality was problematic, the problem was
not significant enough compared to three other locations situated further south of the
borough. In such situations officers face a dilemma; rely on their own experiential
knowledge . . . or respond to the information developed by an analyst with no experience of
“working on the streets.”
Cope, supra note 23, at 200.
278. Interestingly, the degree of familiarity and knowledge of an area does not necessarily
correlate to a more accurate understanding of crime patterns. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 38
(“In addition to citizens’ perceptions of crime patterns, other researchers have studied the spatial
perceptions of police officers as they relate to crime patterns within a city and found that they, too, are
incorrect.”).
279. In Chicago in the late 1980s, the police officials shared crime data with citizens. As described
by Brandon Garrett, “residents often [had] very different ideas of where trouble spots exist in their
neighborhoods. With better computer technology, mapping was for the first time providing a powerful
tool for community members to visualize crime patterns and to evaluate police response.” Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41, 112 (2001); see also Shawn
Monterastelli, Note, Using Law and Law Enforcement to Prevent Violence and Promote Community
Vibrancy near Bars, Clubs, and Taverns, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 239, 259 (2002)
(“[C]ommunity defined hot spots may be quite different from police defined hot spots.” (quoting
Taylor, supra note 40, at 2 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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of color or low-income communities for increased enforcement. Finally,
there are collateral concerns about the economic effect of a high-crime
area designation on communities that are already low income.
A. Crime Data
Any successful adoption of GIS technologies requires data that is
280
accurate and complete. A system is only as good as the data included,
and because that data is collected, inputted, and analyzed by human
beings, there exists the potential for errors. These data errors range from
miscoding or misspelling street names, to using the wrong abbreviations,
281
to providing the wrong numerical address. Data must be inputted in a
timely fashion, it must be reliable, and it must be organized in such a way
282
that crucial information is not lost in the data-transfer process. The
quality of data underlying crime-mapping technologies can be easily
283
compromised through ignorance, overwork, poor training, or error.
At a more fundamental level, crime mapping does not address all
284
crime because not all crime is reported. Unreported crime will not be
mapped or analyzed. Some crimes do not have geographic points of
285
286
reference, while other crimes do not have victims. Because crime
mapping focuses primarily on “street crime,” it creates a disproportionate
emphasis on those types of violations. Thus, even with a fully functioning
crime-mapping program, crime analysts are creating an imperfect proxy
287
for the level of crime in a society. While a particularized approach
makes better use of the existing data, it is still dependant on the accuracy
and completeness of that data.

280. Cope, supra note 23, at 193 (“As the computer intelligence databases were the primary source
of information for analysts, the quality of analysis was integrally linked to the quality of information
on intelligence systems.”).
281. Harries, supra note 7, at 98; see also Boba, supra note 44, at 38–39.
282. Boba, supra note 44, at 38–39.
283. Cope, supra note 23, at 193 (“Data quality affected the development of analysis. Analysts
frequently found crucial details missing from intelligence reports for their products.”).
284. Chainey & Ratcliffe, supra note 24, at 65 (“Crime data recorded in police information
systems offer only a partial view of crime in society, and not all crime reported to the police ends up
being recorded as crime.”).
285. See, e.g., Markovic & Stone, supra note 11, at 2 (“Financial fraud, extortion, and many forms
of conspiracy do not occur at fixed locations and are therefore rarely mapped.”).
286. For example, in a possession offense there is no specific victim, and the criminal would not
usually report his or her own possession to have the crime recorded.
287. Good crime analysis is by its nature overinclusive, whereby even in high-crime areas there are
low crime blocks. Data might show a spike in crime at a particular location, such as at a nightclub or
bar, surrounded by no other crime. Comparisons from a particular area might therefore be inexact,
even with perfect record keeping and data management. Taylor, supra note 40, at 2 (“Even in a high
crime neighborhood, most blocks will have low crime rates, and most addresses will have no reported
crimes. Links between crime and community do not provide the data on specific places needed to
guide deployment of police officers.”).

Ferguson_21 (J. Grantz) (Do Not Delete)

December 2011]

REDRAWING “HIGH-CRIME AREAS”

10/26/2011 11:27 PM

149

B. Crime Analysis
In addition to concerns about data collection methods, there are
concerns about whether the information is analyzed and presented in a
complete and unbiased manner. Incomplete analysis or inaccurate
288
By changing the
comparisons can result in misleading statistics.
analytical parameters, or adjusting the algorithms, crime-mapping
289
analysts can make statistics seemingly support misleading conclusions.
How maps are displayed can also influence the impact of the data. As
one expert stated: “[B]ecause we can lie with statistics, we can also lie
with statistical maps. Indeed, maps have been used throughout history as
290
propaganda tools.”
Reliance on crime analysis must, therefore, be accompanied by an
understanding of the political and administrative pressures that can affect
291
Local politics and involved community groups can
the analysis.
influence how crime patterns are interpreted and how crime-fighting
292
resources are deployed. A particularized approach to crime analysis
reduces the ability to influence decisionmakers, but does not eliminate it.
Furthermore, there is no systemic process for oversight or
transparency in the data analysis. One of the realities in adopting a
crime-mapping analysis system organized and administered by law
enforcement is that there is no outside “check” on the data or analysis.
Without external oversight and expert audits, the integrity of the system
could degrade. While police administrators have every incentive to keep
up-to-date information, political and bureaucratic pressures exist that
could affect the analysis. Much of the testing of this data will take place
in court hearings, in which defense counsel will either challenge the data
288. “The importance of selecting appropriate time periods for mapping cannot be overemphasized.
For example, a map covering a month may mask noteworthy week-by-week variations. Or weekly
maps could hide day-to-day changes.” Harries, supra note 7, at 12.
289. Id. at 53.
290. Id. (citation omitted).
291. See Harries, supra note 261, at 406 (“Baltimore County has shown that residents of low crime
neighborhoods are extremely sensitive to real or perceived changes in crime incidence, and their
sensitivity is politically potent, since such residents tend to be more affluent, better connected
politically, and more active in the political arena, compared to residents of high crime areas. With the
police chief serving at the pleasure of the elected county executive, it is possible that disproportionate
resources may be allocated to nominally low crime areas, thus reducing resources available for
application to more serious problems.”); Willis et al., supra note 10, at 158 (“[P]olice and citizens’
perceptions of crime may differ from what is presented in official sources. Although crime rates might
not have increased dramatically, city residents, politicians, or police could have decided that crime
levels were unacceptably high or not declining fast enough.”); id. at 171 (“City politics powerfully
influenced officer deployment.”).
292. Willis et al., supra note 10, at 163 (“Other[] [officers] felt COMPSTAT denied residents equal
access to police services by allocating more patrols to high crime areas, thereby reducing patrols in
other areas.”). One can also imagine the reverse if, for example, high-crime areas were weighted by
auto thefts or burglaries, then upscale neighborhoods might appear to have a higher level of crime
than other areas with more street crime.
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itself or use the data in challenging a Fourth Amendment stop. In those
cases, courts, through expert testimony, will need to address the validity
and accuracy of the data.
A particularized approach does not directly address this oversight
problem. While the particularized data can be explored relatively easily
293
during a suppression hearing, the underlying data system cannot.
C. Application
Recognizing an existing crime pattern does not dictate the solution
to that problem. Running parallel to the development of CompStat is a
debate about police tactics, pitting those in favor of “community
294
policing” against the more data-oriented approach. The statistics from
295
New York City help fuel the debate. In 2009 alone, 575,000 people
296
were stopped and frisked. Ninety percent of those people were African
American or Latino. Only 1.3% of those detained were caught with
297
weapons, and only 6% were arrested. Some critics of the New York
approach have commented that the need for data motivated the high
298
number of stops. Data-focused administrators demanded arrest data
from the officers. To get more statistics, police stopped more people. A
few New York City police officers even admitted that in some areas
there was a quota of sorts, such that they were encouraged to report at
299
least ten recorded stops a month.
A particularized approach must acknowledge the reality that police
stops involve physical and sometimes intrusive interactions. Even if
targeted to particular problem areas, stops will still generate policecitizen tension. Distrust and resentment can build up over perceived

293. This pressure will come primarily from trial courts, which will require accurate data to serve
as the basis of the court decisions.
294. Livingston, supra note 26, at 562–63 (1997) (discussing the rise of community-oriented
policing, which involves a focus on police-community partnership and problem-solving strategies).
295. Notwithstanding the overall numbers from CompStat in New York, the tactic of flooding a
designated area with officers does not always work. Taylor, supra note 40, at 2 (“Increasing patrol
deployments to higher crime neighborhoods without knowing where and when crimes are likely to
occur within those neighborhoods appears to produce only modest gains in crime control.” (citing
Geroge L. Kelling & Catherine M. Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing
Crime in Our Communities (1996))). More police presence does not necessarily mean less crime.
Weisburd & Eck, supra note 117, at 51.
296. Editorial, Lingering Questions About ‘Stop-and-Frisk,’ N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 2010, at A26.
297. Id.
298. Silverman, supra note 86, at 145 (“[In New York City], [n]umbers, sometimes any numbers,
rule the day. [COMPSTAT], in the words of one participant, is ‘wound up too tight.’ A white Brooklyn
detective, a twenty-year veteran, put it this way, ‘COMPSTAT is everything. People are tired of being
harassed, searched and frisked, and run off the streets. People are fed up; the cops are, too.’” (citing
Eli B. Silverman, NYPD Battles Crime: Innovative Strategies in Policing 212 (2001))).
299. See, e.g., W. Rees Davis & Bruce D. Johnson, Criminal Justice Contacts of Users and Sellers of
Hard Drugs in Harlem, 63 Alb. L. Rev. 877, 917 (2000).
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300

police misconduct. Whether data driven or not, a perception of
mistreatment serves to undermine the legitimacy of the front line
301
responders in the criminal justice system. Tension from an overintrusive
police presence can result in less community cooperation with law
302
enforcement. The hope is that a more particularized approach will
minimize and legitimize these contacts and focus attention on the real
problem areas rather than the broad stop and frisk policies in practice
today.
D. Constitutional Equity
Issues of class discrimination and racial profiling have arisen in
303
regard to high-crime areas since their inception. To have low-income
communities of color officially designated as “problem” neighborhoods
304
invites charges of unequal application of the law. A particularized
approach minimizes the perception of generalized police surveillance but
it cannot eliminate the problem. Further, inequality concerns are not
always clear cut, as many residents of high-crime areas welcome

300. Former Attorney General Janet Reno stated, “‘[t]he perception of too many Americans is
that police officers cannot be trusted . . . . Especially in minority communities residents believe the
police have used excessive force, that law enforcement is too aggressive, that law enforcement is
biased, disrespectful and unfair.” Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1117 (2000)
(footnote omitted); see also Weitzer, supra note 233, 129–30 (“At the neighborhood level, blacks are
more likely than whites to believe that blacks living in the respondent’s own community are treated
unfairly by the police, and that black neighborhoods receive inferior treatment by the police.”).
301. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive OrderMaintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 271, 271 (2009); Luna, supra note 300, at 1119
(“Mistrust of the police not only undermines the perceived authority of the law and agent in question,
but also the legitimacy of all laws and all officials. In the end, mistrusting community members are less
likely to cooperate with law enforcement, less likely to voluntarily provide information to police, and
less likely to comply with legal commands.”).
302. Benforado, supra note 85, at 898 (2010) (“If one of our important normative goals is equal
treatment and equal protection of our citizens by the law, the fact that police—as a result of official
policy and individual discretion—treat people differently depending on the neighborhood in which
they are encountered should disturb us. And it is not just out of a sense of fairness that we should be
concerned. When people in a particular area feel that police mistreat them, individuals are far less
likely to provide the cooperation that police desperately need to clear cases and reduce crime.”).
303. Mia Carpiniello, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person Standard for
“Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 355, 358 (2001); Ronner, supra note 134, at
385; Slobogin, supra note 224, at 405.
304. Richard R.W. Brooks, Fear and Fairness in the City: Criminal Enforcement and Perceptions of
Fairness in Minority Communities, 73 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1219, 1246, 1256–57 (2000) (finding that highincome African Americans, more so that lower-income African Americans, perceived the legal system
as unfair, and that the difference in perception was the result of the low expectations of poorer African
Americans and heightened sensitivity of wealthier African Americans); Garrett, supra note 279, at 57
(2001) (“[P]olice often defend their conduct by arguing that they merely stop people in high crime
neighborhoods—protecting residents and responding to disruptive street activity—or simply respond
to calls where suspects are described as ‘black.’ However, police are often accused of relying on
‘flimsy’ evidence in deciding that certain neighborhoods are crime-prone.”).
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305

additional police presence. Tensions between citizens who perceive
intrusive police treatment are sometimes offset by perceptions of citizens
306
who feel a lack of police protection.
While a particularized approach does not prevent the perception of
unequal treatment, it does prevent police officers and courts from
applying (in practice) a different legal standard in higher-crime areas
than in lower-crime areas. It demands a rigor of analysis between data
and observation that has so far not been applied to the high-crime area
question. If the concern is to prevent the creation of an implicit highcrime area exception to the Fourth Amendment, then a particularized
approach that focuses on specific locations and data, rather than
neighborhood labels, is a move toward constitutional equity.
E. Collateral Concerns About High-Crime Area Labeling
The stigma attached to generalized or particularized high-crime
areas goes beyond criminal consequences. There are direct economic
costs, including less economic development, lower real estate values,
increased social disorganization, and reduced opportunities for
307
employment. “[R]esearch has shown that ‘high crime’ labels create a
destructive feedback loop in which property values decline, causing areas
to become less viable socially. Still other research has shown that
increasing crime rates follow the wide-scale application of ‘criminal area’
308
labels to specific neighborhoods, almost encouraging crime.”
The counterintuitive result is that a greater police presence can, in
309
fact, foster the social conditions that increase crime. Disrupting existing
social connections through arrest, incarceration, or intrusive surveillance
310
causes normal social connections break down. The breakdown of social
305. Brooks, supra note 304, at 1221 (“Frustrated and overwhelmed by gangs, drugs and crime,
blacks in high-crime neighborhoods welcome disproportionately tough criminal sanctions and
expanded police discretion.”).
306. Id.
307. Howell, supra note 301, at 271; Tracey L. Meares, Place and Crime, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 669,
695 (1998) (“Law enforcement policies that generate high levels of incarceration of geographically
concentrated offenders will inevitably lead to family disruption, unemployment, and low economic
status. These are the factors that disrupt the community-level social processes that provide law-abiding
individuals with incentives to build the important networks that reinforce the crime-fighting potential
of law-enforcement policies.”); Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime Metaphors, 67 Brook. L.
Rev. 1035, 1069 (2002) (“[Certain labels resulted in] whole communities [that] remained isolated from
the economic growth of the past three decades in large part because of the stigma of being high crime
areas.”).
308. Paulsen & Robinson, supra note 6, at 38 (citation omitted).
309. Fagan et al., supra note 243, at 1554 (2003) (“[N]eighborhoods with high rates of incarceration
invite closer and more punitive police enforcement and parole surveillance, contributing to the
growing number of repeat admissions and the resilience of incarceration, even as crime rates fall.
Incarceration begets more incarceration, and incarceration also begets more crime, which in turn
invites more aggressive enforcement, which then re-supplies incarceration.”).
310. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear et al., Coercive Mobility and Crime: A Preliminary Examination of
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311

capital can undermine community bonds and pride. While difficult to
quantify, the stigma of living on the “wrong side of the tracks” becomes
amplified if the police have designated your neighborhood as one of the
worst.
An official high-crime area designation may also affect institutions
anchoring a neighborhood. Universities might see decreased enrollment,
and fewer supermarkets and restaurants might decide to open in the
312
313
area. Insurance rates and premiums might rise. In contrast, a
particularized designation, limited to blocks and particular crimes, and
presumably changing over time, would lessen the stigma on certain
neighborhoods.

Conclusion
A particularized use of crime-mapping techniques for Fourth
Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis embraces the promise of datadriven policing, while at the same time minimizing the intrusions on core
liberty interests. It not only adopts the utility of crime-mapping
techniques, but pushes those techniques to be more precise. In doing so,
it recognizes that the high-crime area language courts have been using
for almost forty years is outdated in comparison with the data now
available about a given location. Carving out areas of lesser Fourth
Amendment protection through official high-crime area designations is
not necessary when more targeted information exists about particular
crime types and locations. While such an approach burdens police
administrators with the requirement to educate their officers, in return it
provides police officers with a better understanding about the crime
patterns in a given area. It also cabins the stigmatizing effects of labeling
entire neighborhoods as “high-crime areas.”
A particularized approach also encourages many of the futurethinking policing advances realized by GIS technology. Targeted policing
can reduce crime. Further, by encouraging police-citizen communication
about discrete crime problems, police can avoid much of the community
314
backlash about overbroad police tactics. In sharing the data, police can

Concentrated Incarceration and Social Disorganization, 20 Just. Q. 33 (2003).
311. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community
46, 55–57 (2000).
312. B.A. Glesner, Landlords as Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability
on Landlords for Crime on the Premises, 42 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 679, 774 (1992).
313. John T. Schuring, Detroit’s Renaissance Zones: The Economics of Tax Incentives in
Metropolitan Location Decisions, the Results of the Zones to Date, and Thoughts on the Future, 38 U.
Det. Mercy L. Rev. 329, 358 (2006).
314. Garrett, supra note 279, at 114 (discussing how, when the Chicago Police made the crime data
public and encouraged citizens to participate in the crime-identifying process, citizens were able to
design maps to show police the problem areas, which resulted in successful crime prevention).
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315

empower citizens to participate in solving some of those real problems,
316
creating trust and strengthening community policing strategies.
Finally, a particularized approach provides a measure of
constitutional protection for citizens living in crime-prone areas. If police
are required to act based on the specific crime patterns in an area and are
limited by that particularized information, there will be less chance that
individuals will be stopped based on generalized suspicion. Courts also
will be more empowered to test the connection between the particularized
information of the officer and the police officer’s actual observation on
the street.
Thus, it is time to bid farewell to the “high-crime area” term used in
Fourth Amendment analysis and introduce a more particularized, datadriven approach to the same problem. In doing so, courts can stay
faithful to the existing crime-mapping technology and core Fourth
Amendment values.

315. See Luna, supra note 300, at 1120 (“Empowering citizens through access to government
information and by giving them a voice in the decisionmaking process is not only more democratic, but
has the potential to establish a basis for trust in otherwise distrusting communities.”).
316. Rich, supra note 63, at 11.

